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DOWN BUT NOT OUT-THE LOCK-UP OPTION STILL
HAS LEGAL PUNCH WHEN PROPERLY USED
The hostile takeover recently has taken on new dimensions in frequency,
size and strategies for acquiring and maintaining corporate control.' A hostile
takeover normally commences when an acquiring company or "raider"
makes either an unsolicited tender offer or a proxy solicitation to the target
company's shareholders. 2 In response to the prospect of an unwanted take-
over offer, the target company's directors may implement any number of a
variety of takeover defenses.3 One currently popular takeover defense is the
lock-up option, a device by which the target company induces a friendly
suitor or "white knight" to acquire either outstanding but unissued shares
1. See Lipton and Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Director's Responsibilities-An
Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1403 (1985). The billion-dollar hostile tender offer, rarely
contemplated prior to 1981, has become a frequently occurring transaction. Id.; see also
American Lawyer, Apr. 1986 (Corporate Scorecard Supp.), at 10, 12-13 (listing 34 takeover
acquisitions each exceeding $1 billion). Recent developments in hostile corporate takeovers also
include novel takeover defenses such as the "poison pill," "white squire," "Pac-Man,"
"scorched earth," "golden parachute" and "crown jewel." See generally Lipton and Brown-
stein, supra, at 1419-1424 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of various takeover defen-
ses); SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONERS § 1
(G. Hawkins, M. Stumpf & R. Winfer eds., 1984) (same).
2. Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for Directors: Planning for and Responding
to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAW. 209, 210-11 (J. Hinsey IV, reporter, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines for Directors]. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1984 SECURITIES LAW
HANDBOOK 324 (1984) (hostile takeover refers to offeror bidding optimal price as inducement
for shareholders to tender all outstanding shares). Since control of the target is the desired goal
of corporate raiders, many bidders condition tender offers on receiving a controlling interest in
the target company. Id.; see also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 1983)
(tender offer contingent upon management not opposing raider's bid for control of target);
Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 260 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (tender offers generally contemplate
contingencies for unforeseen adverse events). See generally ARANow & EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 53 (1973) (discussing tender offers and proxy solicitations).
Congress promulgated rules governing proxy solicitations in section 14 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982) (text of '34 Act codifying
proxy solicitation regulations); infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of
lock-up options under '34 Act). The connotation "hostile" refers to the opposition by the target
company's board of directors to block the raider's bid to take effective control of the target
company. See Comment, "Leg-Ups" and "Lock-Ups" An Analysis of Manipulation Under
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 49 ALB. L. REV. 478, 485 (1985) (any director opposition to
takeover offer is "hostile" regardless of reasoning).
3. See Levine and Lykos, Recent Developments in Defensive Strategies, in PLI, HOSTILE
BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1985 105, 105-58 (D. Block, H. Pitt eds., 1985) (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 474) (discussing scope and substance
of numerous antitakeover strategies); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 569-
71 (1982) (listing vocabulary and procedures for antitakeover defenses); see also supra note 1
(listing authorities defining numerous offensive and defensive takeover devices).
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of the target's stock, or a principal asset of the target company for the
purpose of inhibiting hostile bidders.
4
Perhaps the most common type of lock-up, called a stock lock-up, occurs
when a white knight acquires outstanding but unissued shares of a target
corporation.5 A stock lock-up enables the white knight to gain a distinct
advantage over hostile competitors because the white knight obtains both a
bargain price for the stock purchased and transactional efficiency by acquir-
ing a large block of the target's shares. 6 An effective stock lock-up, therefore,
may preclude raiders from engaging in a bidding war for the target.
7
Similarly, a key asset or "crown jewel" lock-up allows a white knight to
acquire a principal asset or assets of the target company after a triggering
event has occurred.8 The triggering event frequently will be the acquisition
of a certain amount of the target company's outstanding stock by any entity
other than the white knight.9 Like a stock lock-up, an asset lock-up enables
4. See FLEISCHER, 1 TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 323-46.9
(Supp. 1985) (thorough substantive treatment of lock-up options); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 6.05[5][d] (defining and evaluating lock-up options); Fraidin and
Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 821, 821 (1981) (examples of lock-up
options); Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Market-
place, in PLI, THIRTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13, 18 (1982) (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton &
R. Mundheim eds. 1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 373)
(arguing that "leg-up" is more appropriate term because "lock-up" option only deters unwanted
offerors rather than eliminating them); Duffy, Lockups Designed to Promote Completion of
the Acquisition, The Nat'l Law J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 15, col. 3 (defining leg-up and lock-up
options); Note, Controlling Imprudent Lock-Ups: The Necessity for Federal Legislation, 63
WASH. U. L. Q. 91, 91-92 (1985) (defining stock and crown jewel lock-up options). By using a
lock-up option as a negotiating tool, a target board may increase the number of otherwise
reluctant suitors to offer a more lucrative bid for control of the target because the lock-up
ensures that the white knight will gain a bargain regardless of whether the offer succeeds. See
Thompson v. Enstar Corp., No. 7641, slip op. at 12-13 (Del. Ch. August 16, 1984) (implementing
voting trust lock-up option induced reluctant white knight to make attractive tender offer);
infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware Court of Chancery's decision
in Enstar).
5. See supra note 4 (sources defining stock lock-up options).
6. See Freund & Volk, Tender Offers: Developments on Offense, in PLI, ELEVENTH
ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13, 27 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Stevenson eds. 1980) (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 319) (benefits from stock lock-up
options inure to white knight directly through deterrence of competing bidders); Note, Lock-
Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1068-69 (1983) (benefits
from stock lock-up options inure to white knight directly through reduced transactional costs)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Lock-up Options]; Note, supra note 4, at 91 n.4 (benefits from stock
lock-up options inure to white knight directly through principle of dilution). Dilution refers to
the reduced percentage of shares that a hostile suitor holds as a result of the increased shares
that the target tenders to the white knight. Id.
7. See supra note 6 (discussing benefits of lock-up options which inure to white knights
at raiders' expense and, consequently, deter hostile bidders).
8. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 4 (defining and distinguishing stock and crown
jewel lock-up options).
9. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir.
1986) (any party acquiring one-third of target's outstanding common stock triggers crown jewel
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the white knight to gain an advantage over hostile competitors because the
asset lock-up normally deters raiders from competing for control of the target
company.'I An asset lock-up option normally deters raiders because the white
knight's power to exercise the option effectively may eliminate the financial
attractiveness of the target company. " Consequently, both stock and asset
lock-up options tend to frustrate attempts by hostile tender offerors to gain
significant control of the target corporation.2
Although target corporations favor lock-up options as an antitakeover
device, unsuccessful raiders and disgruntled shareholders have challenged the
validity of stock and asset lock-up options under both federal securities laws
and state fiduciary duties laws.' 3 A majority of courts, however, recently have
lock-up option); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1245
(Del. Ch. 1985) (any party acquiring 40% of target's outstanding common stock triggers crown
jewel lock-up option), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); supra note 4 (sources defining substantive
provisions of crown jewel lock-up options).
10. See Note, supra note 4, at 91; infra note 11 (discussing effect of lock-up options to
deter raiders from bidding for target company).
11. See Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers,
Lock-Up Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1108 n.81
(1982) (target company selling off key asset has potential of deterring unwanted takeover suitors
because target's sale of assets reduces target's attractiveness). Although lock-up options normally
deter raiders, a lock-up option of one or two crown jewels may not deter an aggressive raider
if the target company possesses numerous lucrative assets or subsidiaries. See Nathan, supra
note 4, at 77.
12. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text (discussing lock-up options and their
effects on unsolicited and solicited tender offerors).
13. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1984)
(challenging target board's grant of employee stock lock-up option as violative of both state
fiduciary duties laws and federal securities laws); Feldbaum v. Avon Products, Inc., 741 F.2d
234, 235 (8th Cir. 1984) (challenging target board's grant of stock lock-up option as violative
of federal securities laws); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 3 (2d
Cir.) (challenging target board's grant of stock lock-up option as violative of federal securities
laws), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 368
(6th Cir. 1981) (challenging target board's grant of stock and asset lock-up options as violative
of federal securities laws), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (challenging target board's grant of asset lock-up option
as violative of federal securities laws); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 175-76 (Del. 1986) (challenging target board's grant of asset lock-up option as
violative of state fiduciary duties laws); see also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)
§ 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative practices in sale of securities);
infra note 14 (discussing effective termination of challenging validity of lock-up options under
§ 14(e) of '34 Act).
Under typical state fiduciary duties laws, the directors of a corporation have an obligation
to exercise a duty of due care and a duty of loyalty. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264-65 (discussing
state law fiduciary duties); infra notes 16-38 and accompanying text (same). In addition to
claims arising under state fiduciary duties laws, aggrieved parties may argue that asset lock-up
options violate state shareholder approval statutes. See Note, Lock-up Options, supra note 6,
at 1074-75 n.39 (discussing potential for using shareholder approval statutes to invalidate various
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rejected the federal law challenge to invalidate lock-up options as a manipulative
practice violative of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
lock-up options). Shareholder approval statutes generally require that shareholders must authorize
or approve any substantial sale of assets not sold in accordance with ordinary business purposes.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 1003 (1981) (shareholders must approve any substan-
tial sale of corporate assets sold by board outside of ordinary business purpose); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.400 (Vernon 1986 Supp.) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:80 (1985 Supp.) (same);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAws § 909 (McKinney 1986) (same). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271
(1983) (shareholders must approve any substantial sale of corporation's assets regardless of whether
sale is for ordinary business purpose). Courts generally define "substantial sale of assets" in
terms of the assets' intrinsic worth to the corporation rather than merely quantifying the market
value of the assets. See Eisen v. Post, 3 N.Y.2d 518, 523, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15, 18, 146 N.E.2d
779, 780 (1957) (shareholder approval statute applies to sale of assets needed to accomplish pur-
pose of incorporation); Fenderson v. Franklin Light & Power Co., 120 Me. 231, -, 113 A.
177, 177 (1921) (precursor to current shareholder approval statute applies to sale of assets essen-
tial to continued life of corporation). In contrast to evaluating the intrinsic worth of the assets,
courts in Delaware apply a more quantitative asset value test. See Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d
1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981) (shareholder approval statute applies to sale of assets constituting
51% or more of corporation's total worth).
14. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2465 (1985) (misrepre-
sentation is required element to prove violation of § 14(e) of Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act)); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (§ 14(e) of '34 Act proscribes fraudulent, deceptive
or manipulative activity associated with tender offer); Finkelstein, Lock-ups in Contested
Takeovers, 17 REV. SEc. REG. 886 (1984) (§ 14(e) is no longer available to challenge lock-up
options under federal securities laws). In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court found that a raider's withdrawal of a hostile tender offer and subsequent
substitution of a friendly tender offer that was favorable to the management of the target did
not violate § 14(e) of the '34 Act. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2465. In holding that "manipulative"
under § 14(e) of the '34 Act requires misrepresentation, the Supreme Court effectively foreclosed
plaintiffs from using § 14(e) to challenge target board grants of lock-up options. See id. After
Schreiber, target boards need only fully and accurately disclose lock-up option terms to
shareholders to comply with the antifraud provisions of § 14(e). See LIPTON & SmEINBERGER,
supra note 4, at § 6.05[5] (lock-up option is permissible under federal securities laws absent
some misrepresentation). In holding that the term "manipulative" under the Williams Act
requires misrepresentation, the Schreiber opinion criticized the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
manipulative devices under § 14(e) enunciated in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., the decision
which launched § 14(e) challenges to invalidate lock-up options. See Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at
2461 n.3 (approving standards enunciated by Second and Eighth Circuits, which conflict with
Sixth Circuit, by requiring misrepresentation for manipulation); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982).
In Mobil, the Sixth Circuit held that the Marathon board inherently had manipulated the
market for Marathon stock by granting U.S. Steel both asset and stock lock-up options which,
in the opinion of the court, created an artificial ceiling on the price of Marathon stock and effec-
tively blocked all competing offers for the stock. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 375. In characterizing lock-
up options as inherently manipulative, however, the Sixth Circuit apparently misconstrued the
Supreme Court opinion in Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, in which the Court restricted the term
"manipulative" to devices that artificially affect the price of stock. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) ("manipulative" within § 14(e) requires artificial tampering
with market price). Contrary to the Mobil court's interpretation of what constitutes "artificial
affect on price," the Santa Fe opinion defined the term as directorial activity by the target board
that is intended to mislead or defraud investors such as wash sales, matched orders or rigged
prices. Id. A lock-up option that is negotiated at arm's length between a target board and a
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While many courts have discredited the argument in support of invalidating
lock-up options under the federal securities laws, several courts recently have
considered whether target boards, by granting lock-up options to white knights,
violate their fiduciary duties to shareholders under state law.'5
In addressing the issue of whether corporate directors violate their
fiduciary duties under state law by implementing defensive tactics, including
lock-up agreements, courts implicitly have engaged in a two-step analysis.'
6
Applying this two-step analysis, a court first determines whether a target
corporation's board of directors has satisfied its fiduciary duty of due care.'
7
The reviewing court then determines whether the board has acted without
self-dealing in accordance with the duty of loyalty.'" Concerning the duty of
due care, courts adhere to the business judgment rule.' 9 The business
judgment rule is a fundamental axiom of corporate law that restricts the
white knight with full disclosure to investors, like the option in Mobil, does not artificially affect
the price of stock within the narrow definition of Santa Fe and, instead, may enhance real market
value for the stock. See id.; Bialkin, Court Costs Cloud Over Option Tactic in Take-overs, Legal
Times of Wash., Jan. 1I, 1982, at 19 (lock-up options negotiated between target and white knight
represent genuine stock value). The Sixth Circuit, subsequently, has limited the Mobil decision
to the facts of the case and has cautioned against applying the Mobil holding indiscriminately.
See Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding stock lock-up
option and standstill agreement as not manipulative under § 14(e)). Furthermore, several lower
courts and commentators have criticized the Mobil decision for misinterpreting the Santa Fe defini-
tion of market manipulation. See, e.g., Feldbaum v. Avon Products, Inc., 741 F.2d 234, 237
(8th Cir. 1984) (misrepresentation is required element of term "manipulative" under § 14(e));
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1018 (1983); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same). See
generally Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation: Tactics and Strategies After Marathon, 36 Sw.
L. J. 975, 991-95 (1982) (arguing that Sixth Circuit in Marathon may have improperly extended
federal securities laws into realm of state fiduciary duties laws); Note, supra note 11, at 1114
(arguing that courts should not automatically invalidate lock-up options under § 14(e) because
lock-ups are not inherently manipulative).
15. See infra notes 16-38 and accompanying text (discussing courts' analysis of whether
use of lock-up options by target boards violate boards' fiduciary duties to shareholders under
state law).
16. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (courts
evaluate actions of target boards faced with hostile takeover bids under both duty of due care
and duty of loyalty); infra note 122 (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Norlin).
17. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984). In Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace Inc., the Second Circuit stated that the duty of due care requires that a
director use the same due diligence in the performance of his duties that a reasonably prudent
individual in an analogous situation and under like circumstances would use. Id. See N.Y. Bus.
CoRp. LAw § 717 (McKinney, 1986) (directors shall act with diligence of prudent man under
similar conditions); see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1979) (same).
18. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984). The
Norlin court noted that the duty of loyalty requires a director to act without self-dealing and
in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 264; see also Ruder, Duty of
Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAw. 1383, 1386-87 (1985) (duty of loyalty
creates obligation on corporation's directors to avoid self-dealing). But see infra note 21 (self-
dealing need not be totally absent if directors' actions primarily further best interests of
corporation and its shareholders).
19. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
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scope of judicial review into managerial decisions of a corporation's board
of directors. 20 The majority of courts interpret the rule as a rebuttable
20. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1000 (1979); see also A.L.I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT § 401(d) (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1984). Section 4.01 of the Corporate Governance Project's Tentative Draft articulates a
definition of the business judgment rule which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(d) A director or officer does not violate his duty under this Section with respect to
the consequences of a business judgment if he:
(1) was informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believed to be appropriate under the circumstances;
(2) was not interested in the subject of the business judgment and made the
judgment in good faith; and
(3) had a rational basis for believing that the business judgment was in the best
interests of the corporation.
Id. See generally Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1437, 1439 (1985) (business judgment rule removes directors' apprehension that incorrect
decision will result in shareholder litigation); FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 178.10-184 (discussing
business judgment rule); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1492-98 (1984) (discussing interrelationship
between business judgment rule and duty of due care); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule
Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L.R. 93, 93-134 (1979) (comprehensive discussion of business judgment
rule); infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing scope of business judgment rule).
The business judgment rule conceptually is similar to another test used in director liability
cases known as the primary purpose test. See FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 163-66. The primary
purpose test focuses on whether a director acted primarily to further the corporation's interest
or the director's self-interest. Id. at 163. Courts usually apply the primary purpose test to cases
involving corporate issuance or repurchase of stock during an on-going battle for control of
the target issuer. See Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying
primary purpose test to target repurchase of stock); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st
Cir. 1977) (applying primary purpose test to target issuance of stock). A Corporation's board
of directors can satisfy the primary purpose test either by establishing that the board's action
was unrelated to the takeover contest for control, or by showing that the board's action to
defeat the takeover bid by the raider primarily was in the best interests of the shareholders. See
McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1958) (upholding target board's
issuance of stock to defeat hostile takeover because of detrimental effect to target's shareholders
if raider successfully acquired corporation); Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
237 Md. I,_, 204 A.2d 795, 805-06 (1964) (upholding target board's issuance of stock to
raise needed capital which had ancillary effect of defeating hostile takeover bid by raider).
Consequently, if a target board can demonstrate that the shareholders' benefit motivated the
actions of the directors, courts may overlook any side-effects which enhanced the board's
control. See Heit, 567 F.2d at 1161-62 (upholding target board's issuance of new stock as
beneficial to shareholders even though board's action effectively foreclosed impending share-
holder contest for control of company); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47,.._.._, 158 A.2d 136,
140-42 (1960) (upholding target board's repurchase of stock as consistent with longstanding
business of target even though board's action effectively enhanced board's incumbency). But
see Royal Indus. Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,136 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (invalidating target board's purchase of company
because primary purpose was to block raider's takeover bid by creating antitrust obstacle and
not to benefit shareholders). Both the primary purpose test and the business judgment rule pro-
vide that a court will not second guess a board decision based on adequate information and
made in good faith. Fleischer, supra note 4, at 166. As a result, any differences between the
primary purpose test and the business judgment rule may be purely cosmetic. Id. at 164-65. See
[Vol. 43:1125
LOCK-UP OPTION
presumption that in reaching a corporate decision, the board of directors
has acted on an informed basis, in good faith and with an honest belief that
the decision was in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. 2'
To enjoy the rule's broad antiliability presumption, directors must adequately
avail themselves of all pertinent information reasonably available to the
board, and to evaluate thoroughly the information prior to reaching a
generally Pitt, Fiduciary Duties in Control Contests, in PLI, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 1985 329, 384-95 (D. Block, H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Hand-
book Series No. 474) (discussing primary purpose test).
21. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 629, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Johnson v. Trueblood succinctly stated the policy behind the
business judgment rule's broad presumption in favor of corporate directors. See Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing policy justifications for business
judgment rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). In Johnson v. Trueblood, minority share-
holders brought a shareholder's derivative suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the defendant majority shareholders, who were
also directors in the corporation, violated four counts of state fiduciary duties laws and federal
securities laws. Id. at 288-89. After the district court ruled in favor of the defendants, the
plaintiffs argued only the state law breach of fiduciary duties claims to the Third Circuit on
appeal. Id. at 289 n.3. In affirming the district court's ruling, the Third Circuit stated that
courts cannot hold corporate directors to the rigorous standards of ordinary fiduciaries. Id. at
292. The Johnson court stated that ordinary fiduciaries cannot act on behalf of their beneficiaries
if the proposed action involves the slightest degree of self-interest. Id. Since almost all corporate
acts and decisions involve some degree of inherent self-interest, however, the Third Circuit
reasoned that to treat corporate directors as ordinary fiduciaries would impede normal business
activities. Id. In addition, the Johnson court noted that a director usually will act in the best
interest of his corporation in an attempt to satisfy shareholders and gain shareholder support
to strengthen the director's position on the board. Id. The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded
that a director's decision, arguably made in the best interest of the corporation, should enjoy
the business judgment rule's presumption that the director acted pursuant to sound management
policy and not for personal gain. Id.
Under the business judgment rule, courts do not inquire into the merits of a board's
decision. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Instead, the courts limit
their inquiry to whether a board, having adequately informed themselves, acted reasonably in
believing that the decision would benefit shareholders. See id. (courts will not substitute their
own judgment in place of director's judgment); Reading Co. v. Trailer Train Co., No. 7422,
slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1984) (courts should refrain from interfering in corporate
decision-making). In contrast, a minority interpretation of the business judgment rule presumes
that directors may have managerial entrenchment motives to solidify their positions on the
board and, therefore, the board has the initial burden to show the fairness of its actions. See
Guidelines for Directors, supra note 2, at 211 (discussing minority view of business judgment
rule). Following the tenets of the minority interpretation of the business judgment rule, some
commentators have argued against limited judicial inquiry into the merits of managerial decisions
because few alternative mechanisms exist to adequately protect shareholders from directorial
abuses of discretion. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender
Offers? 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 277-78 (suggesting that removal and salary reductions are
insufficient to protect shareholders from error-prone directors). Despite the alleged weakness of
the business judgment rule, however, courts still frequently apply the rule. See id. (criticizing
courts that shield directors under business judgment rule even when board error harms
shareholders).
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management decision in good faith. 22 Under this standard, a plaintiff who is
challenging the board's decision may nullify the presumption only by showing
that the board either was not informed or acted in bad faith.
23
In determining whether the implementation of a given lock-up option
complies with the duty of due care under the business judgment rule, courts
have considered at least four key factors to test for an adequately informed
board. First, courts have examined the scope of the board's relevant inquiry
into the pertinent facts of a proposed lock-up option. 24 Second, courts have
22. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-75 (2d
Cir. 1986) (board must apprise itself of all pertinent information and act in good faith to enjoy
broad presumption of business judgment rule); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985) (board must adequately inform itself and act in good faith to enjoy broad presumption
of business judgment rule); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (board must
evaluate all reasonably available information and must act in good faith to enjoy broad
presumption of business judgment rule); Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. at 11 (Del. Ch.
July 6, 1982) (board must evaluate transaction with specificity to enjoy broad presumption of
business judgment rule); Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a
Litigious Society, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 49, 52-53 (1980) (arguing that business judgment rule
creates presumption that director acted in good faith and upon adequate information).
Illustrative of the judicial decisions refusing to sanction corporate directors' uninformed
decisions is the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. Van Gorkom. See Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 872. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to apply the business
judgment rule to shield the Trans Union Corporation (Trans Union) board's hasty and grossly
uninformed decision to consummate a cash-out merger agreement with a subsidiary of Marmon
Group, Inc. (Marmon). Id. at 863-64. In reviewing the applicable standards under Delaware
law, the Van Gorkom court stated that the proper standard of review for deciding whether a
board adequately informed itself is gross negligence. Id. at 873. The Delaware Supreme Court
found that the defendant board's decision to negotiate the Marmon merger agreement breached
the gross negligence standard because the board neither inquired into the intrinsic value of the
company, nor elicited from the Trans Union Chairman, Van Gorkom, the terms by which Van
Gorkom negotiated the proffered cash-out merger price. Id. at 874. The court also stated that
the Trans Union board acted in gross negligence by approving the merger agreement in only
two hours based solely on a twenty-minute presentation by Van Gorkom without adequate legal
and financial advice. Id. at 874-75. Ironically, Van Gorkom himself had not read the actual
merger agreement document. Id. In concluding that the business judgment rule is inapplicable
to shield uninformed decisions, the Van Gorkom court held that the Trans Union board
subsequently had failed to cure the deficiency of its uninformed decision to accept the Marmon
offer. Id. at 884-88. The Delaware Supreme Court implied, however, that a target board, after
having made an uninformed decision, may cure the deficiency by ratifying or amending the
decision on a fully informed basis. Id.
23. Whittaker v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950-51 (N.D. I1. 1982); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979). See supra note 22
(courts imposing duty on directors to act in good faith and with adequate information); see
also Arsht, supra note 20, at 134 (plaintiffs may attack director's decisions on grounds of bad
faith, inadequate inquiry or shareholder detriment).
24. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 276-77 (2d Cir.
1986); infra notes 87-120 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Hanson
Trust); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1246-47 (Del.
Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); infra notes 41-85 and accompanying text (discussing
Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Court of Chancery decisions in Revlon); Thompson v.
Enstar Corp., No. 7641, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch. August 16, 1984); infra notes 127-42 and
accompanying text (discussing Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Enstar).
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reviewed the extent and type of expert legal and financial advice sought by
the board.2" Third, courts have assessed the board's inquiry into and avail-
ability of reasonable alternatives. 26 And fourth, courts have evaluated the
board's celerity and diligence in considering all relevant information.2 7 In
addition, a court may probe any other facts indicative of the target board's
diligence or failure to inform themselves adequately and act in good faith
under the duty of due care.
2
If the reviewing court finds that a board satisfied its duty of due care in
implementing a lock-up option, the court still must focus on the directors'
duty of loyalty. 29 Under the duty of loyalty, a board must avoid conflict of
interest transactions and act reasonably and fairly to obtain the best possible
offer for the shareholders of the corporation. A board, accordingly, must
25. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (court approved
target board's extensive use of antitrust attorney's advice in instituting litigation designed to
defend against hostile takeover), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Co., Inc. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (court approved target board's extensive use of
investment banker's advice in defending against hostile takeover); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid
Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D. Neb. 1972) (court approved target board's utilization of
accountants' advice in defending against hostile takeover), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973);
Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (court approved board's utilization of
investment bankers' advice in defending against hostile takeovers).
26. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 1986 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,863, at 94,212-13
(6th Cir. 1986) (availability of reasonable alternatives is factor to consider in reviewing directors'
decision); Thompson v. Enstar, Corp., No. 7641, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch. August 16, 1984) (court
favorably noted. target board's extensive attempt to solicit alternate bids for control of target).
27. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1986)
(refusing to apply business judgment rule to asset lock-up option in part because board deliberated
transaction for only three hours); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (refusing
to apply business judgment rule to merger agreement decision in which board deliberated for
only two hours); supra note 22 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom);
infra notes 87-120 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Hanson Trust).
But see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (corporate realities frequently require
board of directors to act with celerity), cert. denied sub nom. City Trust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
28. Cf. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 287 (2d Cir.
1986) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (under duty of due care evaluation for an informed board acting
in good faith courts should consider all factors relevant to board's actions that state law
permits). The concept of good faith under the duty of due care has three requirements: director
disinterestedness, nonegregious board conduct and independent director judgment. See Hansen,
The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment
Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237, 1248-49 (1986) (discussing good faith requirements
under duty of due care).
29. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. See id. In suggesting that directors must act in the corporation's best interest under
the duty of loyalty, the Second Circuit in Norlin alluded to § 713(b) of the New York Business
Corporation Law. Id.; see N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 713(b) (McKinney 1986) (courts will not void
transactions of financially self-interested board if transaction is fair and reasonable to corpora-
tion); see also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del.
Ch. 1985) (explaining that Delaware law proscribes directors from acting in a manner that in-
fringes on shareholders' best interest under duty of loyalty), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
see generally Ruder, supra note 18, at 1386 (directors have obligation under duty of loyalty to
avoid conflict transactions).
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act without self-dealing or design to entrench itself, although courts usually
will not question an ancillary increase in the board's power as a result of
the directors obtaining the best offer for shareholders., Several courts
effectively have superimposed the duty of loyalty onto the business judgment
rule based on the rebuttable presumption that the corporate board acted in
the shareholders' best interest.32 Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing that a board was self-dealing or acted to entrench itself, however,
the burden shifts to the directors to prove that the board acted in the
shareholders' best interest. 3 In determining whether a board meets its duty
of loyalty, courts have examined several criteria including the fairness and
independence of the corporate board, 34 the extent to which self-interests or
shareholder benefits primarily motivated the board to grant the lock-up
option, 3' the necessity of the lock-up to ensure competitive bidding for the
target, 36 the tenacity employed by the board in negotiating with competing
suitors in conflict transactions 37 and the overall effect that the decision had
on maximizing shareholder benefits.38 Recently, courts in both Delaware and
31. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (business judgment rule
protects director decisions that involve ancillary self-interest when decisions primarily benefit
shareholders), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); supra note 21 (discussing Third Circuit's
decision in Johnson).
32. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 301 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (plaintiff has initial burden to prove board acted in bad faith or was
engaged in self-dealing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Co., Inc. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 300 (3d Cir.
1980) (Rosen, J., concurring and dissenting) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Northwest
Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. I11. 1969) (same); Muschel v.
Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973) (same).
33. See supra note 32 (cases holding either expressly or implicitly that initial burden on
plaintiff shifts to directors when plaintiff raises .evidence of self-dealing by board).
34. See, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 383 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding
target board's independent director initiated merger agreement takeover defensive scheme);
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (D. Md. 1982) (upholding
target board's fairly conceived independent director-initiated lock-up option takeover defensive
scheme); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. I11. 1982) (upholding target
board's lock-up option takeover defensive scheme in which independent directors composed
majority of board); Thompson v. Enstar Corp., No. 7641 slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch. August 16,
1984) (upholding target board's fairly conceived independent director-initiated voting trust lock-
up option); see infra notes 127-42 (discussing Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Enstar).
35. See infra note 20 (authorities discussing effect of board action under primary purpose
test).
36. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1986) (target board granted lock-up without receiving arguably more competitive bid) with
Thompson .v. Enstar Corp., No. 7641, slip op. at 12-13 (Del. Ch. August 16, 1984) (target
board granted lock-up as condition to receiving demonstrably more competitive bid).
37. See Note, Lock-up Options, supra note 6, at 1070-71 (courts should inquire into
tenacity of board negotiations with white knight as factor to determine beneficial lock-up vel
non).
38. See Lockwood v. OFB Corp., 305 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Ch. 1973) (directors have duty
to pursue best price available for assets entrusted to their care); see also Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194-95 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (directors have duty to repel inadequate
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the Second Circuit have applied the two-step analysis to invalidate target boards'
decisions to grant asset lock-up options to white knights. 9
In affirming an opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery, which held
that a board of directors violated its duty of loyalty by implementing an asset
lock-up option, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc."° cast uncertainty on the continued validity of lock-
up options."' In Revlon, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., an affiliate
of Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride) brought an action in the Delaware Court
of Chancery to preliminarily enjoin Revlon from consummating a merger agree-
ment with Forstmann Little and Co. (Forstmann Little).' 2 The intended merger
tender offers effectively harming shareholders), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(same).
39. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir.
1986) (invalidating lock-up option violative of duty of due care); infra notes 87-120 and
accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Hanson Trust); MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250-51 (Del. Ch. 1985) (invalidating
lock-up option as violative of duty of loyalty), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); infra notes 41-
85 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery decisions in Revlon).
40. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
41. See Ln'ioN & STEIN aERGER, supra note 4, at § 6.011] (Revlon decision questions
validity of lock-up option as effective antitakeover device).
42. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175-79. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
Pantry Pride initially brought an action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to invalidate a
poison pill takeover defense instituted by Revlon's board of directors. Id. at 179. The poison
pill or shareholder rights plan is a complex hostile takeover defense that converts the shareholder
held notes of a target company into rights to purchase a raider's common stock at a reduced
price in the event of a raider's hostile acquisition of the target company. See Fogelson, Some
Recent Defensive Strategies in Corporate Takeovers, in PLI, HOrLE BArEs FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 1985 187, 191-96 (D. Block, H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 474) (discussing scope and use of poison pill plans). A hostile suitor
acquiring a certain percentage of the target's outstanding stock normally triggers the noteholders'
rights. See generally Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" As A Takeover
Defense, 2 J. CoRP. L. 25, 25-40 (1985) (defining substantive variations of poison pill plans).
In Revlon, the poison pill plan provided that Revlon shareholders could acquire one
redeemable "right" for each share of common stock held. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. The rights
enabled the holder to exchange one share of common stock for a note valued at $65 bearing
12qo interest and maturing within one year. Id. The acquisition of 20%o beneficial ownership
of Revlon by anyone would trigger the rights, unless the acquiror purchased all Revlon's shares
for $65 or more in cash. Id. In addition, the plan specified that the Revlon board could redeem
the rights for I0C each at any period prior to the 20% acquisition triggering event. Id. The intended
effect of the poison pill plan was to discourage all tender offers for control of Revlon below
$65 per share and to encourage all bidders for control of Revlon to negotiate directly with the
Revlon board. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Del.
Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The $65 per share price deterred offerors because
the price was high in relation to Revlon's liquidation value. Brief for Appellee at 5, Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellee].
After initially bringing suit to invalidate the poison pill plan, Pantry Pride amended the
complaint twice to correspond to permutations in Revlon's defensive tactics. MacAndrews &
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between Revlon and Forstmann Little arose out of the Revlon board's desire
to obtain a more lucrative bidder for control of Revlon. 43 Pantry Pride
presented to the Revlon board an initial informal cash tender offer for any
and all shares of Revlon stock, but the Revlon board disapproved of the offer
on the basis that the offer was too low, contained high risk financing and
would break-up the company.44 Instead, the Revlon directors, following the
advice of special counsel Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
unanimously adopted two defensive mechanisms-a stock repurchase plan and
a Note Purchase Rights Plan or "poison pill"-aimed at deterring Pantry
Pride from commencing a hostile takeover battle for control of Revlon.' Pantry
Pride, nevertheless, made a formal all-cash tender offer to Revlon shareholders,
which Pantry Pride conditioned on recission of the poison pill plan."' The
Revlon directors recommended that Revlon shareholders reject Pantry Pride's
offer and, instead, the directors issued an exchange offer of notes for stock
which specified that Revlon would purchase its own stock in exchange for
a combined security of subordinated notes valued at forty-seven and one-half
dollars principal and eleven and three-quarter percent interest, and one-tenth
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986). The first amended complaint sought to enjoin Revlon from favoring Forstmann
Little by rescinding the poison pill plan for Forstmann Little but not lifting the plan for Pantry
Pride. Id. at 1242. The second amended complaint sought to enjoin Revlon from granting to
Forstmann Little a lock-up option on Revlon's National Health Laboratories and Vision Care
divisions in conjunction with the modified merger agreement. Id. at 1246; see infra notes 51-52
and accompanying text (discussing substance of Revlon asset lock-up option to Forstmann Little).
Finally, Pantry Pride sought a temporary restraining order to block Revlon's board from transferring
any corporate assets in conjunction with the Forstmann Little modified merger agreement. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
43. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175.
44. Id. at 176-77. In Revlon, Pantry Pride's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) met with
Revlon's CEO in an attempt to mediate a friendly takeover of Revlon by Pantry Pride. Id. at
176. As a result of the meeting, Pantry Pride notified the Revlon board that Pantry Pride was
willing to offer Revlon shareholders $42 to $43 cash per share in a friendly tender offer, or $45
cash in a hostile tender offer. Id. In refusing the proposed Pantry Pride tender offer as grossly
insufficient, the Revlon board relied on advice from Revlon's investment banker, Lazard Freres
& Co., whose representative indicated that $60 to $70 per share represented a fair range for
Revlon stock. Id. at 176-77. In addition to finding the Pantry Pride price inadequate, the
Revlon board rejected Pantry Pride's tender offer because of Pantry Pride's apparent use of
subordinated debentures or "junk bond" financing of the tender offer. Id. at 177; see infra
note 91 (discussing "junk bond" financing).
45. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. Following the Pantry Pride informal tender offer to the
target board in Revlon, the Revlon directors authorized the company to repurchase up to 5
million of its nearly 30 million outstanding shares of common stock. Id. Concomitant with the
repurchase plan, the directors implemented a Note Purchase Rights Plan or "poison pill." Id.;
see supra note 42 (discussing Revlon poison pill plan).
46. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. In Revlon, Pantry Pride made an initial formal all-cash
tender offer to Revlon shareholders for $47.50 per share for Revlon common stock, which
included $26.67 per share for preferred stock. Id. Pantry Pride conditioned the offer, however,
on the availability of financing and the rescission of the poison pill plan. Id.
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of a share of cumulative preferred stock. 47 In response to the Revlon




The Revlon directors countered the new Pantry Pride offer by entering
into a merger agreement with Forstmann Little that, among other provisions,
entailed a leveraged buyout. 49 Although Pantry Pride again increased the
amount of its all-cash tender offer and informed representatives from
Forstmann Little that Pantry Pride would supercede all competing bids for
Revlon stock, the Revlon board rejected the Pantry Pride offer.5 0 The Revlon
board then negotiated a modified merger agreement with Forstmann Little
that called for recission of both the exchange offer and poison pill plans,
while including a lock-up provision granting Forstmann Little an option to
purchase two principal Revlon assets." The agreement specified that Forst-
47. Id. The Revlon exchange offer placed antitakeover covenants on the notes for the
benefit of the noteholders. Brief for Appellee, supra note 42, at 7. The Revlon directors,
however, reserved the right to waive the covenants by a simple majority vote of the independent
directors. Id. The antitakeover covenants effectively inhibited a hostile takeover attempt because
the covenants impeded Revlon's ability to incur debt, froze the price of Revlon stock dividends,
forbade Revlon from purchasing its own stock and limited the sale of Revlon's holdings to 2%
of its assets. Id. By exchanging the subordinated notes and preferred stock for shares of
common stock, the Revlon board received 87% of Revlon's common stock, which decreased
Revlon's equity from $1.035 billion to $460 million. Id.
48. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. After the Revlon directors implemented the exchange offer
in Revlon, Pantry Pride announced a new tender offer at S42 per share, conditioned on 90%
acceptance of the outstanding Revlon stock. Id. In view of the completed exchange offer,
however, Revlon's investment banker, Lazard Freres & Co., valued the $42 per share offer
equal to the initial $47.50 per share Pantry Pride offer. Id. When Pantry Pride met with
continued hostility from the Revlon board, the corporate raider raised the price of its tender
offers to $50 cash per share and then $53 cash per share for any and all Revlon common stock.
Id.
49. Id. at 178. In Revlon, the Revlon board met to discuss alternatives to the most recent
Pantry Pride hostile tender offer of $53 cash per share. Id.; see supra note 48 (discussing
sequence of Pantry Pride tender offers for Revlon stock). As a result of proposals made to the
Revlon board by Forstmann Little and the investment group of Adler & Shaykin, the directors
approved a merger agreement with Forstmann Little. Id. The merger agreement provided for
each shareholder to receive $56 cash per share financed through a leveraged buyout. Id. In
addition, Forstmann Little would assume a substantial debt resulting from the Revlon board's
ill-fated issuance of the exchange offer plan, and the Revlon directors would waive the
antitakeover covenants on the exchange offer notes. Id.; see infra note 65 (discussing potential
litigation resulting from Revlon board's issuance of exchange offer plan); supra note 47
(discussing covenants Revlon board placed on exchange offer notes).
50. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. In Revlon, Pantry Pride responded to the Revlon-Forstmann
Little merger agreement by raising its all-cash tender offer to $56.25 per share for any and all
Revlon stock. Id. Pantry Pride conditioned the offer on the nullification of the exchange offer
plan, a waiver of the note covenants and the election of three Pantry Pride directors to the
Revlon board. Id.; see supra note 47 (discussing covenants Revlon board placed on exchange
offer notes). Concomitant with the $56.25 cash per share offer, Pantry Pride informed
representatives of Revlon that Pantry Pride would nominally exceed any subsequent Forstmann
Little offer. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. The board rejected the Pantry Pride offer, nevertheless.
See id. (Revlon board negotiated modified merger agreement after Pantry Pride offer).
51. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. To counter the latest Pantry Pride offer, the Revlon board
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mann Little could exercise the lock-up option when any individual or entity
acquired at least forty percent of Revlon's outstanding shares. 2 Additionally,
the merger agreement included a "no-shop" clause providing that Revlon
would not negotiate with other potential acquirors of the corporation. 3
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agreement specified that Forst-
mann Little would issue new senior subordinated notes, apparently in an
attempt to help the Revlon board avoid litigation resulting from the plum-
meting value of the exchange offer notes . 4 After the Revlon board had
disapproved of all subsequent Pantry Pride tender offers,5 Pantry Pride
challenged the Revlon-Forstmann Little merger agreement, maintaining that
the Revlon directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the company and
its shareholders by implementing the poison pill defense and granting the
lock-up and no-shop agreements.
5 6
In addressing the issues of whether the lock-up option and no-shop
agreements violated the Revlon board's fiduciary duties, the Delaware Court
of Chancery examined each of the board's actions under the Delaware
business judgment rule. 7 The court initially observed that the adoption of
in Revlon entered into a modified merger agreement with Forstmann Little, which stipulated
that Forstmann Little offer $57.25 per share for Revlon common stock. Id. The agreement also
specified that the Revlon management would not participate in the leveraged buyout. Id.
Furthermore, the agreement provided for the Revlon board to deposit into escrow a S25 million
cancellation fee for Forstmann Little's use should either the deal fail or another acquiror obtain
more than 19.9% of Revlon's stock. Id. Finally, while providing for rescission of both the
exchange offer and poison pill plans, the agreement granted Forstmann Little a lock-up option
to purchase the National Health Laboratories and Vision Care divisions of Revlon for $525
million. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. See Jewel Co., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555,
1561-62 (9th Cir. 1984) (no-shop clause is basically exclusive merger agreement between target
and acquiring suitor). The Ninth Circuit in Jewel noted that no-shop clauses may benefit
shareholders on two grounds. Id. at 1563. First, a no-shop clause may be the only avenue to
ensure the best offer for the target's shareholders by inducing an otherwise reluctant suitor to
bid for the target. Id. Second, the use of a no-shop clause can reduce substantially the
transactional costs of merging the firms by focusing corporate financial resources into evaluating
only one transaction. Id. But see Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co. Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1304
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (boards of directors must eschew any device, such as no-shop clause, that
prevents shareholders from receiving opportunity of more lucrative bid).
54. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79. The Revlon court found that the Forstmann Little senior
subordinated increasing notes would replace the exchange offer notes that the Revlon board
had issued. Id. The effect of the Forstmann Little action would be to boost the value of the
exchange offer notes and avoid vexing shareholder litigation for the incumbent Revlon board.
Id.; see infra note 65 (discussing potential litigation resulting from Revlon board's ill-fated
issuance of exchange offer notes plan).
55. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177-78; see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing
Pantry Pride's subsequent tender offers and Revlon board's countermeasures).
56. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; see supra note 42 (discussing Revlon board's poison pill
plan); supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon-Forstmann Little lock-up
and no-shop agreements).
57. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1247-49. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Revlon noted that
under the business judgment rule, a target board faced with a hostile tender offer that is
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the poison pill plan was a valid exercise of managerial discretion to oppose
Pantry Pride's original offer and to strengthen the bargaining power of the
Revlon board. 8 Additionally, the court of chancery reluctantly characterized
the exchange offer as defensible, despite the likelihood that implementing
the exchange offer would result in the "bust-up" of Revlon.5 9 Furthermore,
the court held that lock-up options are not illegal per se and that the Revlon
board had implemented the lock-up and no-shop agreements based on an
informed managerial decision.6
In determining whether the business judgment rule protected the direc-
tors' decisions to implement the lock-up and no-shop provisions under the
duty of loyalty, the court of chancery seriously questioned the propriety of
the merger agreement between Revlon and Forstmann Little. 6' The court
noted that in exchange for procuring a one dollar per share increase over
Pantry Pride's top prelitigation offer, the Revlon board granted Forstmann
Little a lock-up option to acquire one of Revlon's crown jewel assets, the
National Health Laboratories division, for at least seventy-five million dollars
below Revlon's own valuation of that asset.62 The court of chancery further
found that the no-shop clause effectively prohibited negotiations with all
other prospective acquirors and, thereby, impeded the competitive bidding
process.6 3 In addition, the court noted that target boards must implement
defensive tactics that are proportionate to the objective needs of shareholders
and not designed to enhance the convenience of directors. 64 Since the Revlon
detrimental to the target company and the company's shareholders has a duty to adopt
appropriate defensive tactics. Id. at 1247. The Revlon court explained, however, that the
business judgment rule does not permit unbridled discretion in the implementation of defensive
tactics. Id. Rather, the Revlon court noted that the board must adopt measures reasonably
designed only to oppose the danger perceived. Id.
58. Id.; see Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1082-83 (Del. Ch.) (upholding
validity of poison pill antitakeover device), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
59. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1247.
60. Id. at 1250; see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (grant of
lock-up option is not per se violation of directors' fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018
(1983).
61. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1248-51.
62. Id. at 1249. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Revlon stated that at the time Revlon
modified the merger agreement, Forstmann Little's offer of $57.25 numerically topped Pantry
Pride's offer of $56.25. Id. at 1248-49. Revlon's own investment banker and other finance
experts, however, valued Forstmann Little's offer as inferior to Pantry Pride's offer because of
the delay and uncertain interest in the Forstmann Little bid. See Brief for Appellee, supra note
42, at 18-19 (discussing expert opinions valuing Forstmann Little's offer as varying from slightly
to greatly inferior to Pantry Pride's offer). The court of chancery also found that Revlon's
own investment banker valuated the crown jewel assets at least $75 million higher than the
lock-up option price. Revlon, 501 A.2d. at 1249. The court further discovered that the investment
banker characterized the fairness of the option price only from Forstmann Little's perspective
and did not consider the fairness from Revlon's perspective. Id.; see infra note 108 and
accompanying text (discussing court's role in analyzing valuation of assets under duty of due
care).
63. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249.
64. Id. at 1250; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
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directors negotiated the Forstmann Little merger agreement to avoid litigation
concerning the issuance of the exchange offer and to increase the value of
the exchange offer notes, 65 the Revlon court held that the board failed to
comply with its obligation to shareholders to obtain the best price possible
for assets entrusted to the directors' care. 66 The court of chancery, therefore,
held that the board violated its duty of loyalty because the lock-up and no-
shop agreements arguably did not procure the best price for Revlon's
shareholders, 67 stifled rather than stimulated competitive bidding for control
of Revlon6" and were indicative of the board's self-interest by subordinating
the rights of the shareholders to protect the rights of the exchange offer
noteholders. 69 Accordingly, the court of chancery enjoined the Revlon board
from consummating the lock-up and no-shop agreements with Forstmann
Little.
70
1985) (adopted defensive measures primarily must benefit shareholders and not directors' self-
interest).
65. See Revlon at 1249-50. In Revlon, when Forstmann Little commenced its leveraged
buyout, the value of the exchange offer notes held by Revlon shareholders plummeted. Brief for
Appellee, supra note 42, at 14. The notes, which the Revlon board initially valued at $100, fell
to $87 because of the heavy borrowing on Revlon's assets that accompanied the Forstmann
Little leveraged buyout. Id. at 13-14. Aggrieved noteholders threatened litigation against the
Revlon directors on the ground that the Revlon board failed to adequately inform the noteholders
of the potential detrimental effects that the approval of the Forstmann Little deal and waiver
of covenants would have on the notes. Id. at 15-16.
66. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1248. The Revlon court of chancery held that the Revlon board's
duty transformed into procuring the maximum price per share tendered to shareholders because
the directors realized after setting up the exchange offer that any takeover scheme, hostile or
otherwise, would liquidate Revlon's assets. Id. at 1248; see supra note 38 (cases holding that
target boards have duty to pursue best possible price for corporation assets and to repel
inadequate offers). The court suggested, however, that the Revlon board violated its duty
because the directors excluded Pantry Pride, the bidder who could have provided shareholders
with the highest price, from the same information and opportunities that the Revlon board
freely provided Forstmann Little. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1248. The Revlon court found that the
Revlon board did not invite Pantry Pride to participate on the same negotiational level as
Forstmann Little, nor did the Revlon board share financial data with Pantry Pride, nor invite
Pantry Pride to the Revlon boardroom, nor share information concerning Forstmann Little's
bids with Pantry Pride, which the Revlon board shared with Forstmann Little concerning Pantry
Pride's offers. Id.
67. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249-50. Although Pantry Pride's top prelitigation offer was
$56.25 cash per share, Pantry Pride raised the offer to $58 shortly after conclusion of oral
argument before the Revlon court of chancery. Id. at 1246; see supra note 50 and accompanying
text (Pantry Pride informed Revlon representatives that Pantry Pride would supersede all
Forstmann Little offers); supra note 62 (financial experts valued Forstmann Little's $47.25 offer
as inferior to Pantry Pride's $56.25 prelitigation offer).
68. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249.
69. Id. at 1250; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (potential litigation from
noteholders of declining exchange offer notes motivated Revlon board to pursue Forstmann
Little merger agreement); supra note 65 (discussing exchange offer litigation problem); supra
note 66 (Revlon board failed to procure best price for shareholders by pursuing Forstmann
Little merger agreement to exclusion of Pantry Pride).
70. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1251-52.
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On an interlocutory appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
court of chancery's injunction of the Revlon-Forstmann Little lock-up and
no-shop agreements. 7' In affirming the court of chancery's decision, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon primarily focused on the Revlon board's
heightened duty to obtain the highest price for Revlon shareholders once the
directors knew that the break-up of Revlon was imminent. 72 The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the Revlon directors violated their duty of loyalty
by subordinating the interests of the shareholders for the benefit both of the
exchange offer noteholders and the self-interests of the directors to avoid
litigation.73 In addressing the Revlon board's contentions that the directors
acted without self-interest and in good faith to protect the noteholders, who
were also corporate constituencies, the Revlon court interpreted previous
Delaware Supreme Court precedent as holding that directors rationally must
relate their actions to the accrual of benefits for shareholders.7 4 The supreme
court rejected the Revlon board's arguments that the noteholders needed
financial protection by observing that in a competitive auction for a com-
pany's assets, a board cannot consider the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies unless those interests rationally are related to benefits inuring
to shareholders.7 5 The Revlon court added that the Revlon directors' asser-
tions failed because contractual agreements fixed the rights of the notehold-
ers.76 Additionally, the supreme court affirmed the court of chancery's
decision to enjoin the no-shop clause since the agreement eliminated, rather
than intensified, the Revlon board's negotiations to procure the highest
auction price for Revlon's assets.
77
Although the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the court of chancery's
decision that the Revlon board violated its duty of loyalty, the supreme court
71. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
72. Id. at 182. The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon noted that when Pantry Pride
continued increasing the amount of its tender offer, the Revlon board realized the inevitability
of the corporation's break-up. Id. The court observed that upon realizing that any acquiror
would break-up Revlon, the Revlon board's discretion under corporation policy to repel an
inadequate bid transformed into a duty zealously to solicit the best price for shareholders. Id.
73. Id. at 183-84; see Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250 (court of chancery recognition that Revlon
board failed to procure best price for shareholders because board pursued Forstmann Little
merger agreement to benefit noteholders and avoid potential litigation concerning exchange
offer); supra note 65 (discussing exchange offer litigation problems).
74. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180. In addressing the Revlon board's proffered defenses, the
Revlon supreme court opinion interpreted the court's prior decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. Id.; see Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors
may consider corporate constituencies beyond shareholders). In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors may implement defensive measures to
protect a corporation from perceived harm in connection with a hostile tender offer. Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955. Although the Unocal court held that a target board may consider factors
that effect the entire corporate enterprise, the court strictly confined board defensive actions merely
to thwart the threat posed. Id.
75. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 184.
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also stated that the Revlon directors breached their duty of due care. 78 The
Revlon court, however, did not clearly articulate the legal distinction between
the duty of due care and the duty of loyalty.79 In neglecting to articulate the
distinction between the two fiduciary duties, the court primarily addressed
the loyalty issues involving the self-interestedness of the Revlon board's
actions that subverted the benefits of the Revlon shareholders. 0 As a result,
the Delaware Supreme Court effectively comingled its inquiry of the Revlon
directors' fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty."' Indicative of the Revlon
court's comingling of the duties of due care and loyalty are the apparently
conflicting holdings of the court-in separate portions of the Revlon opin-
ion-that the Revlon directors, by granting the lock-up and no-shop agree-
ments, first breached their duty of loyalty and, subsequently, violated their
duty of due care.8 2 The vacillation of the supreme court may reflect the
court's position that although the Revlon directors adequately informed
themselves, the board neither complied with the requisite showing of good
faith under the duty of due care, nor acted without self-interest to maximize
shareholder benefits under the duty of loyalty.83 The Delaware Supreme
Court, however, did not expressly state that the court based its holding on
violations of both state law fiduciary duties. 84 Consequently, in light of the
Revlon supreme court's failure to elucidate the distinction between director
responsibilities under the duty of loyalty and the duty of due care, the court
of chancery's opinion, which squarely rested its holding on a finding that
the Revlon board had violated its duty of loyalty, provides the clearer
guidelines for directors faced with the decision of whether to implement an
asset lock-up option."
78. Id. at 185.
79. Compare id. at 182-85 (Delaware Supreme Court articulating no distinction between
duties of due care and loyalty) with supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text (articulating
distinction between duties of due care and loyalty).
80. See id. at 182-84 (court based affirmance of court of chancery's decision primarily on
grounds that Revlon board breached duty of loyalty to shareholders); supra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text (discussing duty of loyalty issues addressed by Delaware Supreme Court in
Revlon).
81. Cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179-80 (suggesting business judgment rule has both due care
and loyalty components).
82. Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (Revlon supreme court holding that Revlon board
violated duty of loyalty) with id. at 185 (Revlon supreme court concluding that Revlon board
violated duty of due care).
83. See id. at 185 (holding that Revlon board did not act in good faith by subordinating
shareholder rights to benefit exchange offer noteholders); id. at 182 (holding that Revlon direc-
tors breached duty of loyalty by elevating self-interests to avoid litigation over maximizing
shareholder interests).
84. See id. at 182-85.
85. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Revlon). The court of chancery in Revlon more correctly adjudicated the Revlon
board's actions under the duty of loyalty than under the duty of due care. See MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985) (fixing liability on
Revlon directors for breach of duty of loyalty), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); see also Norlin
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Relying in part on the Delaware Court of Chancery's opinion in Revlon,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. 1 recently addressed whether an asset lock-
up option violates a board's duty of due care."1 In Hanson Trust, Hanson
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (defining distinction between
duty of due care and duty of loyalty); supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (criteria that
courts use in determining whether directors have complied with or breached duty of loyalty).
Several factors that the Delaware Supreme Court mentioned in Revlon suggest that the Revlon
directors failed in their duty of loyalty to act without conflicting interests in obtaining for
shareholders the best price for the Revlon assets. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (factors suggesting
Revlon board violated duty of loyalty). In addition, the supreme court held that, under the
duty of due care, the Revlon board adequately informed itself and acted in good faith concerning
the implementation of both the poison pill and exchange offer plans. Id. at 180-81; see supra
note 42 (discussing poison pill plan implemented in Revlon), supra note 47 and accompanying
text (discussing exchange offer plan implemented in Revlon). Furthermore, the Revlon court of
chancery's opinion suggests that the Revlon directors granted the lock-up and no-shop agree-
ments based on an informed decision. See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); supra text
accompanying note 60 (suggesting that court of chancery's decision in Revlon found directors
complied with duty to adequately inform themselves).
Although the duty of due care requires directors to act in good faith in addition to
pursuing adequate information, the duty of loyalty specifically proscribes directors from
elevating self-serving interests to the detriment of shareholders. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264-65
(comparing duties of due care and loyalty). Moreover, both courts in Delaware and New York
that have applied fiduciary duties laws to address the validity of director decisions have focused
primarily on the extent to which target boards adequately informed themselves, and the celerity
of their decision-making under the duty of due care. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1986) (court focused on factors showing target
board inadequately informed itself in finding breach of duty of due care); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1984) (same). In contrast, under the duty of loyalty, courts
have focused on the motivations of directors and the beneficial or detrimental effect that a
board decision had on shareholders. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264-65 (court faced with allegations
of breach of loyalty must focus on director motivations and detrimental effect to shareholders);
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (court faced with allegations of breach of
loyalty must focus on director motivations when shareholder rights are affected). Consequently,
the supreme court's opinion in Revlon suggests that, contrary to contemporary judicial trends,
the duty of due care's requirement of good faith subsumes the duty of loyalty. Cf. Brief for
Appellant at 21, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (allegations that Revlon board violated duty of due care presents novel departure from
general Delaware judicial interpretation of duty under Van Gorkom). Perhaps a better analysis
of the Revlon board's actions is that the board adequately informed itself arguably in good
faith (by upholding the rights of the exchange offer noteholders) under the duty of due care,
but ultimately failed, under the duty of loyalty, to obtain the best price for shareholders by
entering into a conflict of interest transaction with Forstmann Little to avoid litigation
concerning the issuance of the exchange offer plan. Cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79 (factors
contributing to Revlon board's decision to grant lock-up option to Forstmann Little). In the
alternative, an appropriate assessment of the actions of the Revlon board may be that the
directors simply violated both the duty of due care and the duty of loyalty. See supra note 183
(separate portions of Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Revlon stated violations of different
fiduciary duties).
86. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 266-67. In relying in part on the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in
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Trust PLC and certain of its affiliates (Hanson Trust) brought an action to
preliminarily enjoin SCM Corporation (SCM) from consummating a merger
agreement with Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. and certain of its
affiliates (Merrill Lynch). 8 The intended merger between SCM and Merrill
Lynch arose out of the SCM board's desire to obtain adequate competition
for control of SCM.8 9 Hanson Trust tendered an initial all-cash offer for any
and all shares of SCM common stock, but SCM's directors disapproved of
the offer as being too low." SCM then entered into negotiations with Merrill
Lynch that culminated in an initial tender offer-merger agreement between
the two companies. 9' Hanson Trust responded to the agreement by increasing
the amount of its all-cash tender offer, but conditioned the bid on SCM's
refusal to implement any lock-up options with a white knight. 92
The SCM directors disapproved of the Hanson Trust offer and, instead,
entered into a revised merger agreement with Merrill Lynch that entailed a
management-backed leveraged buyout commencing with a tender offer for
Revlon, the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. held that
Hanson Trust is indistinguishable from Revlon on four principal grounds. Id. at 279 n.9. First,
the SCM board violated their duty of due care, not their duty of loyalty and, therefore, the
Revlon board's self-interestedness to avoid litigation was not a factor in Hanson Trust. Id.
Second, like the Revlon board, the SCM board realized that granting the lock-up options to a
white knight effectively would preclude competitive bidding for the target company. Id. Third,
the undervaluation of the SCM optioned assets were as detrimental to SCM shareholders as
were the undervalued Revlon optioned assets to Revlon shareholders. Id. And finally, the SCM
board, like the Revlon board, failed to provide adequately for the respective board's shareholder
interests. Id.
88. Id. at 266-67.
89. Id. at 267.
90. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848, 851-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd
sub nom., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). In
Hanson Trust, Hanson Trust initially presented a tender offer to SCM shareholders for any
and all shares of SCM common stock at $60 per share. Id.
91. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270. In Hanson Trust, the initial merger agreement between
SCM and Merrill Lynch specified that Merrill Lynch would acquire SCM through a leveraged
buyout that included a cash tender offer of $70 for up to 85% of SCM's common stock. Id. The
leveraged buyout permitted certain members of SCM's management to acquire up to a 15%
equity position in the resulting corporation. Id. at 269. The SCM-Merrill Lynch agreement also
called for a merger in which Merrill Lynch would exchange the remaining SCM common stock
for subordinated debentures or "junk bonds" valued at $70 per share. Id.; see Lipton and
Brownstein, supra note 1, at 1411-12 (defining junk bonds and their uses). Junk bonds are
high-yield, high-risk, low-credit bonds usually accompanied by equity options. See id. Junk
bond financing of successful tender offers frequently result in bust-up takeovers. Id. A bust-up
takeover occurs when a raider sells off the target company's individual assets to finance the
acquisition. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 n.2 (Del.
1986).
92. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270. In response to the SCM-Merrill Lynch merger
agreement in Hanson Trust, Hanson Trust raised its all-cash tender offer to $72 per share for
any and all SCM common stock. Id. Hanson Trust, however, conditioned the offer upon the
SCM board terminating the merger agreement with Merrill Lynch. Id.
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up to eighty percent of SCM's common stock. 93 As consideration for entering
into the revised merger agreement, the SCM board also agreed to pay Merrill
Lynch both a nine million dollar "goodbye" fee and a six million dollar
"hello-again" fee.94 Additionally, Merrill Lynch agreed to follow the tender
offer with a merger in which Merrill Lynch would exchange the remaining
shares of SCM common stock for high risk subordinated debentures or
"junk bonds." 95 The Merrill Lynch merger agreement also called for a lock-
up provision granting Merrill Lynch an option to purchase two key SCM
assets. 96 The agreement specified that Merrill Lynch could exercise the lock-
up option when any individual or entity acquired more than one-third of
SCM's common stock. 97 In response to the revised agreement, Hanson Trust
terminated its tender offer and, alternatively, purchased approximately twenty-
five percent of SCM's common stock in a combination of privately negotiated
and open market acquisitions.9 Hanson Trust then again increased its all-
cash tender offer for all SCM stock, but conditioned the offer on the
elimination of the Merrill Lynch lock-up option. 99 The SCM board did not
eliminate the lock-up option granted Merrill Lynch, but, rather, the directors
issued an exchange offer plan of notes for stock to protect SCM shareholders
in the event that neither the Hanson Trust nor Merrill Lynch tender offers
succeeded.'10 Hanson Trust subsequently challenged the SCM board's deci-
93. Id. at 270-71. In Hanson Trust, Merrill Lynch entered into a revised merger agreement
with SCM which called for Merrill Lynch to pay $74 per share on a fully diluted basis for up
to 80% of SCM's common stock. Id. In addition, the agreement revived the leveraged buyout
proposed specified in the initial merger agreement in which SCM management conceivably could
own up to 15% of the post-takeover corporation. Id. at 270.
94. Id. at 270. In Hanson Trust, the $9 million "goodbye" fee compensated Merrill
Lynch for making an offer if Hanson Trust blocked the intended SCM-Merrill Lynch merger
by acquiring at least 340o of SCM's stock. Id.; see N.Y. Bus. Coi'. LAw § 903(a)(2) (McKinney
1986) (New York state law requires two-thirds shareholder approval for merger agreement). The
$6 million "hello-again" fee merely compensated Merrill Lynch for entering into the revised
merger agreement. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270.
95. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270. The Hanson Trust court noted that the value of the
junk bonds in the revised SCM-Merrill Lynch merger agreement was $74 per share. See supra
note 91 (defining junk bonds).
96. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270. In Hanson Trust, the SCM board granted Merrill
Lynch a lock-up option to purchase two crown jewel SCM assets, the Durkee Famous Foods
division for $80 million and the Pigments division for $350 million. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 271-72; see Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 50-54 (2d Cir.
1985) (discussing litigation occurring as result of Hanson Trust's acquisition of SCM stock).
99. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 272. In response to the revised SCM-Merrill Lynch merger
agreement in Hanson Trust, Hanson Trust increased its all-cash tender offer to $75 per share
for any and all SCM common stock. Id.
100. See id. at 272. In an attempt to safeguard SCM shareholders in the event that neither
the Hanson Trust nor Merrill Lynch takeover bids succeeded, the SCM board in Hanson Trust
instituted an exchange offer plan. Id. The exchange offer plan provided that each SCM
shareholder could exchange each share of SCM common stock for a share of SCM preferred
stock valued at $64 and $10 cash. Id. The exchange offer could be exercised for up to two-
thirds of the SCM common stock on a fully diluted basis. Id.
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sion to grant the lock-up option as violative of the board's fiduciary duties
to the company and its shareholders.' 0'
In considering whether the lock-up option violated the SCM directors'
duties of due care and loyalty, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York examined the New York law concerning the
application of the business judgment rule. 02 The district court noted that
the SCM directors did not violate their duty of loyalty because the board
was independent and had not acted based on self-interest or in an attempt to
entrench itself. 03 Concerning the duty of due care, the district court found
that the business judgment rule protected the SCM directors because the
board adequately had informed themselves of the competing tender offers
and had acted in the best interests of the corporation.1 4
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the finding of the Hanson Trust district court that the SCM directors
did not breach their duty of due care.1°5 In reversing the district court's
decision, the Second Circuit first stated that the SCM directors owed a duty
of due care to the company's shareholders to thoroughly pursue material
information and outside advice prior to deciding an issue affecting substantial
shareholder rights. '0 The Second Circuit held that the SCM directors failed
to meet this duty because the board neither sought qualified legal and
financial advice, nor adequately informed themselves as to the substantive
aspects of the merger agreement prior to granting Merrill Lynch the asset lock-
up option.'0 7 The Second Circuit also found disfavor with the SCM directors'
101. See id. (parties presented evidence concerning fairness to shareholders of SCM board's
decision to grant lock-up option to Merrill Lynch).
102. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 856. In Hanson Trust, the district court relied on a previous Second Circuit
interpretation of the New York Business Corporation Law § 713(b) which concerns the effect
of loyalty on corporate transactions. Id.; see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
264-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (corporate boards eijoy rebuttable presumption that directors acted in
best interests of corporation under duty of loyalty); supra notes 18, 30-38 and accompanying
text (defining and discussing duty of loyalty and relationship of duty to business judgment
rule); see also N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 713(b) (McKinney 1986) (contracts negotiated by
corporate boards that are fair and reasonable are valid).
104. Hanson Trust, 623 F. Supp. at 857. In Hanson Trust, the district court relied on a
previous Second Circuit interpretation of the New York Business Corporation Law § 717 that
concerns the duty of due care. Id. at 856; see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d
255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (corporate boards enjoy rebuttable presumption that directors act using
due care); supra notes 17, 19-28 and accompanying text (defining and discussing duty of due
care and relationship of duty to business judgment rule); see also N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 717
(McKinney 1986) (corporate boards may rely on outside financial and legal advice to arrive at
business decision). In accordance with § 717 of the New York Business Corporation Law, the
district court found that the SCM board permissibly relied on advice from SCM's independent
legal and financial advisors in reaching an informed business decision. Hanson Trust, 623 F.
Supp. at 857-58.
105. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 267.
106. Id. at 274-75.
107. Id. at 275. In finding that the SCM board failed to comply with its duty to seek
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decision to grant Merrill Lynch the lock-up options because an adequate in-
quiry into the valuation of the locked-up assets would have revealed the in-
adequate option price. I" In addition, the Second Circuit expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the celerity of the SCM board's decision to approve the lock-up
options after a brief heat-of-the-battle deliberation.' 0 9 The Second Circuit then
rejected the lock-up option as tending to eliminate, rather than facilitate, the
competitive bidding for control of SCM because the lock-up option effectively
foreclosed the possibility of SCM shareholders obtaining alternate bids for
the sale of their SCM stock." 0 Although the Second Circuit did not expressly
find a breach of the SCM board's duty of loyalty, the court noted that when
faced with the leveraged buyout proposal, the independent SCM directors in-
herited a heightened responsibility to ensure that the action taken was primarily
for the benefit of the shareholders and not the interested management.' Since
the Second Circuit concluded that Hanson Trust easily had established a prima
facie showing of a breach of the duty of due care, the court shifted the burden
to the SCM directors to prove that, under the circumstances, the actions of
the board were fair and reasonable to the SCM shareholders.
' 2
qualified financial and legal advice before granting the asset lock-up option to Merrill Lynch,
the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust stated that the board never seriously questioned SCM's in-
vestment banker, Goldman, Sachs & Co., concerning the fair value of the optioned assets. Id.
In addition, the SCM board failed to inquire about how SCM would look financially if Merrill
Lynch exercised the lock-up option. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the SCM directors merely
relied on verbal, conclusory opinions from the investment banker during a brief three-hour delibera-
tion over the Merrill Lynch proposal. Id. Although the Hanson Trust court observed that Martin
Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, SCM's special counsel, advised the board that the
business judgment rule protected the board's decision to grant the lock-up option, the Second
Circuit concluded that the directors could not rely on Lipton's opinions without first adequately
informing themselves of the substantive provisions of the agreement. Id. at 275-76.
108. Id. at 276. In Hanson Trust, the Second Circuit found that Merrill Lynch's price of
$350 million was at least $70 million below the lowest fair valuation of the Pigments asset, and
that the $80 million price was at least $10 to 25 million below the lowest fair valuation of the
Durkee Foods asset. See id. at 278-80. In concluding that the SCM board failed to adequately
inquire into whether the price of the optioned assets were fair, the Second Circuit found that
three independent appraisals valued the Durkee Foods asset at $100 million, $90-110 million
and $105 million respectively. Id. at 280. Concerning the Pigments business, three separate
appraisals valued the asset at $420-544 million, $420-500 million and $550 million, all appreciably
greater than the Merrill Lynch lock-up price. Id. at 279. But see supra note 6 (lock-ups inherently
give white knights bargain prices as inducement for tender offer).
109. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275; (target board approved merger agreement that
included lock-up option after three-hour meeting).
110. Id. at 277.
111. Id.; see supra note 91 (discussing opportunity for SCM management to profit from
leveraged buyout).
112. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277; see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
264 (2d Cir. 1984) (once plaintiff proves self-dealing on part of target board, burden of proof
shifts to board to show fairness); infra note 122 (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Norlin).
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In attempting to justify its actions in granting the asset lock-up option,
the SCM board argued that the option prices were not undervalued." 3 The
Second Circuit, however, rejected the board's contention, stating that the SCM
directors had not familiarized themselves adequately with the substantive pro-
visions of the merger agreement prior to granting the lock-up options of Mer-
rill Lynch." 4 The Second Circuit also rejected the SCM directors' second
proffered justification that under the primary purpose test the board sought
an optimal bid for the shareholders by negotiating the lock-up option."' The
primary purpose test places a burden on the target's board to show that the
action was primarily in the best interest of the company and its shareholders. "6
In finding no merit in the SCM directors' argument, the Second Circuit held
that the SCM board showed little or no evidence suggesting that the lock-up
would inure to the benefit of SCM and the company's shareholders.' '7 Finally,
the SCM board contended that the court should uphold the lock-up option
in question as a device that facilitated competition in the market for SCM
stock." 8 The Second Circuit, however, dismissed the argument, holding that
the existence of the optioned assets effectively handicapped any competing
offers for control of SCM stock. ' '9 Consequently, while maintaining that a
lock-up option is not illegal per se, the Second Circuit granted Hanson Trust's
motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that the SCM board had
breached its fiduciary duty of due care to the SCM shareholders.' 0
113. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277-78.
114. Id. at 278-80. In rejecting the SCM board's argument that $350 million represented a
fair price to SCM's shareholders for the Pigments asset, the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust
stated that the investment banker who calculated the $350 million valuation, based on tonnage
of pigments, admitted the fallacy of valuing an asset on that basis. Id. at 278; see supra note
108 (discussing undervaluation of optioned assets).
115. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281.
116. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962); see supra note 20 (discussing primary
purpose test and relationship of test to business judgment rule).
117. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281. In rejecting the SCM board's argument that the lock-
up options were in the best interests of the SCM shareholders, the Second Circuit in Hanson
Trust held that the agreement burdened shareholders with too many risks in the event of an
unsuccessful merger with Merrill Lynch. Id. The Second Circuit specifically pointed to the
arguably better Merrill Lynch tender offer that arbitrageurs valued at not more than 75 cents
to $1 greater than Hanson Trust's bid. Id. The Hanson Trust court noted that in exchange for
the Merrill Lynch offer, the SCM board paid Merrill Lynch $15 million in transaction fees,
granted a lock-up option for two inadequately priced crown jewel assets, entered into a questionable
management-interested leveraged buyout plan and left shareholders bearing the risks of under-
valuation of their shares in the event of an unsuccessful SCM-Merrill Lynch merger. See id. at
281-82.
118. Id. at 282.
119. Id. In rejecting the SCM board's proffered justification for granting Merrill Lynch
the lock-up option in Hanson Trust, the Second Circuit opined that the SCM directors realized
that implementing a lock-up option would foreclose competitive bids. Id. Because a consumma-
tion of the SCM-Merrill Lynch deal would deter competitive acquirors and leave SCM share-
iolders at risk concerning the undervaluation of their SCM stock, the Second Circuit found no
merit in the SCM directors' argument. Id.
120. Id. at 273; see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (granting
[Vol. 43:1125
LOCK-UP OPTION
By refusing to allow target board of directors to implement antitakeover
asset lock-up options, both the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust and the Delaware
Supreme Court in Revlon have limited corporate directors' broad reliance
upon the business judgment rule.'2 ' Other recently litigated cases also support
the Hanson Trust and Revlon decisions, which imply that courts carefully
will scrutinize the use of all varieties of lock-up options in determining whether
lock-ups are permissible defensive devices.' 2 Furthermore, many commentators
already have suggested that the courts purposefully have embarked on a
judicial trend towards restricting the availability of the business judgment
lock-up option is not per se violation of directors' fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018
(1983); supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing Hanson Trust's prima facie breach
of duty of due care); supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
rejection of Hanson Trust's proffered justifications for breaching duty of due care). But see
Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 285-91 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (contending SCM directors did not
violate their duty of due care). The Hanson Trust dissent argued that the business judgment
rule shielded the SCM directors from judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the board's decision
to grant the lock-up option. Id. at 287. The dissent also asserted that the SCM directors were
fully justified in relying on the opinions of their legal and financial advisors, as well as on the
board's own business acumen and experience. Id. at 287-89.
121. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 283 (narrowing availability of business judgment rule
to safeguard board's grant of lock-up option); supra notes 87-120 and accompanying text
(discussing Second Circuit's decision in Hanson Trust); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-85 (narrowing
availability of business judgment rule to safeguard board's grant of lock-up option); supra
notes 41-85 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery decisions in Revlon).
But cf. supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (board of directors generally enjoy broad
antiliability presumption under business judgment rule).
122. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-67 (2d Cir. 1984)
(refusing to protect target board's decision to implement ESOP lock-up option under business
judgment rule); DMG, Inc. v. Aegis Corp., No. 7619, slip op. at 7-8 (Del. Ch. June 29, 1984)
(rejecting white knight's attempt to enforce target board's grant of lock-up option under
business judgment rule); Thompson v. Enstar Corp., No. 7641, slip op. at 11-12 (Del. Ch.
August 16, 1984) (court closely scrutinized target board's grant of lock-up option prior to
validating use of lock-up); infra notes 127-42 (discussing Delaware Court of Chancery's decision
in Enstar). In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., the Norlin Corporation (Norlin) board, in
response to large block purchases of company stock by hostile investors, set-up an employee
stock option plan (ESOP) that effectively placed voting control of the company in Norlin's
board. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 259. In refusing to apply the business judgment rule to validate the
board's decision to implement the ESOP, the Second Circuit held that all board decisions must
be fair and reasonable to survive a plaintiff's challenge under the duty of loyalty. Id. at 264-
65. The Norlin court concluded that the Norlin board acted solely to entrench management. Id.
at 266-67. Consequently, the Norlin decision suggests that the business judgment rule will not
safeguard any defensive tactics primarily aimed towards management self-interest. See id.;
Lipton and Brownstein, supra note 1, at 1406 (Norlin court narrowed scope of business
judgment rule as applied to ESOP lock-up options); see generally FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at
364.3 (state courts closely scrutinize lock-up options under current interpretations of business
judgment rule); LiproN & STEINBERGER, supra note 4, at § 6.05[5] (although business judgment
rule may shield most target board defensive schemes, courts carefully will scrutinize board
decisions to grant lock-up options). But see generally Balotti, Finkelstein and Abrams, Fiduciary
Standards in Control Contests, in PLI, SIXTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 323, 350-53 (1984)
(J. Friedman, M. Nathan & H. Pitt eds. 1984) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 464) (courts should allow target boards discretion in implementing takeover defenses
under business judgment rule).
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rule to safeguard corporate use of lock-up options.23 Whether the judicial
limits placed on the scope of the business judgment rule to protect a target
board's takeover defenses is beneficial or detrimental to a corporation's
shareholders, however, remains a matter for debate among scholars.
24
Nevertheless, courts and directors apparently need guidance concerning the
proper method to evaluate the validity of a lock-up option on a consistent
basis.' 25 Perhaps the most clearly articulated opinion in distinguishing be-
tween a beneficial and a harmful lock-up option is the Delaware Court of
Chancery's opinion in Thompson v. Enstar Corp.126
In upholding the validity of a voting trust lock-up, 27 the Enstar court
stated that the primary question concerning the legality of lock-up options
is whether a board of directors has acted both reasonably and in the
shareholders' best interest.'12 In Enstar, two shareholders of Enstar Corpo-
ration (Enstar) brought an action to preliminarily enjoin Enstar from con-
cluding a lock-up option that effectively gave Unimar Corporation (Unimar)
a controlling interest in Enstar's subsidiary and principal asset, Enstar-
Indonesia. 29 The Enstar board fomented the shareholder action by soliciting
123. See supra note 122 (sources suggesting that courts are narrowing scope of business
judgment rule to lock-up options).
124. Compare Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 20, at 278-92 (arguing that courts should
refuse to uphold target takeover defenses under business judgment rule); Riley, Takeover
Decision May Spin Tactical Shift, Nat'l. L. J., Jan. 20, 1985, at 3, col. 3 (applauding court's
refusal in Hanson Trust to uphold target board's grant of lock-up option under business
judgment rule) (quoting Dennis Block, Hanson Trust's attorney) with Herzel, Schmidt & Davis,
Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Coip. L. REv. 107, 107-15
(1980) (arguing that courts should uphold target takeover defenses under business judgment
rule); Riley, supra, at 8, col. 4 (lock-up options protect shareholder interests by stimulating
more lucrative offer) (quoting Bernard Nussbaum, SCM's attorney).
125. See Note, Lock-up Options, supra note 6, at 1079-81 (courts lack guidance in
distinguishing between harmful and beneficial lock-up options).
126. No. 7641, slip op. (Del. Ch. August 16, 1984).
127. Id. at 12-13. A voting trust lock-up is a device by which a white knight acquires an
interest to vote as a controlling shareholder in issues affecting some principal subsidiary or asset
of the target company. See id.; Nathan, supra note 4, at 47 (defining voting trust lock-up
option). A voting trust agreement usually is not an effective lock-up independent of stock or
asset acquisition of the target. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 47. The apparent weakness of an
independently granted voting trust lock-up is that shareholder approval is unnecessary in response
to several takeover techniques. Id. A voting trust lock-up, however, that confers shareholder
control in a corporation also permits the optionee to elect its own slate of directors. See Enstar,
slip op. at 10-I1. Consequently, in some situations, an independently-granted voting trust lock-
up may convey a very valuable corporate power. See Nathan, supra note 4, at 47 (discussing
strengths and weaknesses of voting trust lock-up).
128. Enstar, slip op. at 12.
129. Id. at 2-3. In Thompson v. Enstar Corp., the plaintiffs represented the two largest
shareholders of Enstar Corporation. Id. at 2. The plaintiffs, apparently controlling enough
votes to replace the incumbent Enstar board, were concerned that the voting agreement granted
Unimar effectively would remove the benefits of control inherent in a successful proxy contest.
See id. at 3 (voting trust lock-up option arose out of incumbent Enstar board's fear that board
would lose proxy contest with plaintiff shareholders).
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a tender offer from Unimar for control of Enstar." 0 As a condition to
submitting an offer, however, Unimar demanded that the Enstar board
effectuate certain by-law amendments and grant a lock-up option."' The by-
law amendments and lock-up option took the form of a voting trust
agreement in which Unimar obtained the voting control rights to Enstar's
interest in Enstar-Indonesia.1 2 Under the voting trust agreement, Enstar
would grant Unimar the voting control of Enstar-Indonesia irrespective of
whether the Unimar tender offer succeeded."
3
Concerned that a new slate of directors would take control of Enstar at
the next shareholders meeting and liquidate the company, the Enstar board
consummated the intended voting trust agreement with Unimar."34 To circum-
vent what the incumbent Enstar board perceived as a threat harmful to
shareholders, the directors solicited tender offers from over one hundred
companies within approximately a one-month period.' 3' During the thirty-
day period, the Enstar board received only one firm bid, the Unimar
conditional tender offer. 36 In determining whether to enjoin the lock-up
option, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that a court must adduce the
validity of a target board's actions based on the facts available to the board
at the time that a suitor conditioned its offer."37
In upholding the validity of the voting trust lock-up option, the Enstar
court applied the business judgment rule to shield the Enstar board's decision
to grant Unimar the voting control in Enstar-Indonesia.11s The court of chancery
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 10-11.
133. Id. at 4. The voting trust agreement in Enstar that the Enstar board granted to
Unimar gave Unimar a voting control interest in Enstar-Indonesia regardless of whether 51%
of Enstar's shareholders accepted the tender offer, Id.
134. Id. at 3. In Enstar, the incumbent Enstar board feared that the controlling shareholder
in Enstar-Indonesia, plaintiff Huffington, would liquidate the key Enstar asset or simply
continue the business' operation. Id. at 7-8. If Huffington liquidated Enstar-Indonesia, share-
holders would suffer financially because the bust-up price of the Enstar assets would be less
than a tender offer aimed at capturing the Enstar assets intact. See id. at 12-13 (Unimar tender
offer was six to eight dollars per share higher than market value of Enstar stock). If Huffington
continued operation of Enstar, shareholders also would suffer because Huffington would siphon
out the corporate assets. See id. at 8 (continued operation of corporation was not in shareholders'
best interest).
135. Id. at 7. In Enstar, the one-month period represented a deadline arguably imposed
by Unimar on its tender offer. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 7. In Ensar, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that the Enstar board
seriously interviewed 26 prospective buyers during the one-month solicitation period. Id. Only
Unimar submitted a formal bid for Enstar stock in which the company offered Enstar
shareholders $18 per share. Id. at 12. Unimar subsequently raised the price to $20 per share for
Enstar stock. Id. at 13.
137. Id. at 9-10.
138. Id. at 10. In Enstar, the court of chancery relied on the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Aronson Y. Lewis, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Delaware General
Corporation Law concerning application of the business judgment rule. Id. at 6; see Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (interpreting Delaware business judgment rule codified
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found that the Enstar board had acted in the company shareholders' best in-
terest on four grounds. First, the Enstar directors comprised a'disinterested
body since ten of the twelve board members were independent directors. 139
Second, the directors exhaustively canvassed numerous companies in search
of competent tender offers to present to the Enstar shareholders.',4  Third,
the Enstar board acted reasonably in granting the lock-up option because the
lock-up was necessary to ensure the Unimar bid.' 4' And finally, the offer that
the Enstar board accepted represented a fair value for the assets involved and
was within the range suggested by Enstar's investment bankers.'4 2
In evaluating Hanson Trust and Revlon in light of Enstar, the apparent
distinguishing factor is that the SCM and Revlon boards, unlike the Enstar
board, simply failed to meet their threshold fiduciary duties under state
law.143 Concerning the duty of due care, the court of chancery in Enstar
permitted the Enstar board to invoke the business judgment rule to shield
the directors' decision primarily because the plaintiffs did not overcome their
burden of showing that the Enstar directors were inadequately informed.' 4 4
As previously stated, when a board has availed itself of all relevant infor-
mation prior to making a managerial decision in good faith, courts have
allowed the board to enjoy the antiliability presumptions of the business
judgment rule. 41 While the Delaware Supreme Court has found violations
of the "adequately informed" condition only when directors act with gross
negligence,' 46 the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust appears to have applied a
lesser degree of director negligence in refusing to uphold the SCM board's
grant of the lock-up options to Merrill Lynch. 47 The SCM board, therefore,
in § 141(a) of Title 8 of the Delaware Annotated Code to protect board decision made on an
informed basis and based on qualified consultation); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a)
(1983) (authorizing board of directors to govern corporations incorporated under Delaware
law).
139. Enstar, slip op. at 7.
140. Id. at 12; see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (noting that Enstar board
made numerous tender offer solicitations to prospective bidders).
141. Enstar, slip op. at 12; supra text accompanying note 131 (Unimar conditioned bid on
obtaining voting trust lock-up option).
142. Enstar, slip op. at 12. In Enstar, Morgan Stanley & Co., Enstar's investment banker,
noted that $20 per share for the voting trust asset was well within a fair valuation range. Id.
143. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (distinguishing Enstar from Hanson
Trust and Revlon).
144. See Enstar, slip op. at 10.
145. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 2d. Cir. (1984) (plaintiff
has initial burden of proving bad faith or lack of sufficient inquiry by board); supra notes 22-
23 and accompanying text (discussing burden or proof under business judgment rule).
146. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1984); supra note 22 (discussing
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom).
147. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275; supra notes 135-36, 140-42 and accompanying
text (stating that SCM board's actions did not rise to same level of gross negligence as Trans




may have avoided liability by following the Enstar board's example of
thoroughly seeking alternate bidders for the company, extensively reviewing
the viability of all competing offers and assessing the fair valuation of the
lock-up option assets from the target's own viewpoint. 4 8 Similarly, concern-
ing the duty of loyalty, the Enstar board, unlike the Revlon board, success-
fully implemented a lock-up option in the Hanson Trust court's opinion
because the disinterested Enstar directors acted reasonably and in the best
interest of the Enstar shareholders. 49 Consequently, the Revlon board may
have eluded liability by following the Enstar board's example of using a
disinterested board of directors, acting primarily to maximize shareholder
benefits and negotiating the lock-up option only to ensure a more competitive
offer.
50
The Enstar opinion, however, should not be read as a broad permit
authorizing corporate directors to grant lock-up options in the heat of a hostile
tender offer.' Like the courts in Hanson Trust and Revlon, the court of
chancery in Enstar expressed considerable doubt concerning whether lock-up
options are ever in the shareholders' best interest.' The Enstar opinion noted
that lock-up options often prevent open competition for assets and infringe
on the voting rights of shareholders and, thus, can be detrimental to
shareholders.5 3 While recognizing that lock-ups are not illegal per se, the court
of chancery opinion intimates that close judicial scrutiny of lock-ups on a
case-by-case basis is warranted to ensure that directors act in the best interests
of the corporation's shareholders.' 54
Despite the close judicial scrutiny that lock-up options may engender,
directors should not hasten to abandon the lock-up, which remains attractive
from a board of directors' viewpoint for several reasons. First, lock-ups
encourage white knights, which are otherwise noninterested suitors, to bid
for control of the target.' Second, lock-ups tend to ensure the completion
148. See Enstar, slip op. at 12; supra notes 135-36, 140-42 and accompanying text (Enstar
board adequately informed itself of voting trust lock-up option).
149. See Enstar, slip op. at 12-13; supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (summarizing
Enstar board's reasonable decision to grant voting trust lock-up option).
150. See Enstar, slip op. at 12-13; supra notes 139, 141-42 and accompanying text (Enstar
board acted in best interests of shareholders).
151. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing judicial trend toward
narrowing use of business judgment rule to validate lock-up options).
152. See Enstar, slip op. at 11 (lock-up options may chill competing tender offers, may
lead to waste of corporate assets and often infringe on the voting rights of shareholders); supra
notes 87-120 (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Hanson Trust); supra notes 41-85 (discussing
Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Court of Chancery decisions in Revlon).
153. Enstar, slip op. at 11; see supra notes 4, 6 (authorities discussing benefits and
detriments of lock-up options).
154. Enstar, slip op. at 11-12.
155. See supra note 4 (lock-up may increase number of otherwise reluctant bidders to
pursue acquisition of target); see generally Note, "Lock-up" Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of
Securities Exchange Act, 12 SErON HaLL L. REv. 881, 882 (1982) (lock-up may stimulate bidding
process).
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of a proposed merger.156 Third, if a bidding war occurs, a lock-up may
induce the white knight to offer an increased price since the white knight
already has locked-up a key asset at a bargain price.' Fourth, lock-ups
allow the target's board to solicit offers from those entities or individuals
whom the directors choose. 5 Finally, and most importantly, lock-up options
deter potential or actual hostile offerors from impeding an attractive trans-
action with a white knight. 5 9 In light of these advantages, corporate directors
faced with a hostile tender offer have a real interest in predicting when a
lock-up option legally can accomplish the goal of deterring unwanted take-
over bids. Nevertheless, while lock-up options may benefit shareholders by
increasing the competitive bidding for control of a target, lock-up options
also may foreclose generous offers from hostile bidders and, consequently,
subordinate shareholder interests. '60 Additionally, lock-ups may enable a self-
interested board of directors to entrench itself.' 6' In view of the conflict
between the attractiveness of the lock-up from a board's viewpoint and the
increased judicial scrutiny of lock-ups due to the potential harm to share-
holders, directors need effective advice concerning whether they can use the
lock-up option and still avoid liability.
In approaching the decision of whether to implement a lock-up device
to repel a hostile takeover, corporate directors must attempt to promote the
interests of the company's shareholders. 62 Although commentators have
suggested certain general procedures to reduce the chance that a court will
invalidate a lock-up option, 63 directors wishing to negotiate a legal lock-up
need more specific guidance. The Revlon, Hanson Trust and Enstar decisions
provide several implicit guidelines that a board of directors may follow to
deter a court from enjoining a lock-up arrangement.1'1 In light of the
156. See Duffy, supra note 4 (recent history shows lock-up options effectively close
acquisition of target by raider).
157. See FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 323 (lock-ups may increase shareholder opportunities
in bidding war for target).
158. See id. (lock-ups encourage board discretion in selection of white knight).
159. See LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 4 (principle advantage of lock-up is deterrent
to hostile suitors).
160. Enstar, slip op. at 11; see supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (Delaware Court
of Chancery's evaluation of lock-up options in Enstar); Note, Lock-up Options, supra note 6,
at 1079-82 (lock-up options either may benefit or harm a target company's shareholders).
161. See Balotti, Finkelstein & Abrams, supra note 122, at 330 (courts will not sanction
defensive measures implemented primarily to entrench incumbent management).
162. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 20, at 277-81 (arguing that business judgment
rule should not shield corporate directors' actions to repel tender offers not beneficial to
company's shareholders).
163. See Nelson, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.-The Decision and Its Implications
for Future Tender Offers, 7 CORP. L. REv. 233, 264-65 (1984) (suggesting five questions courts
should address in considering validity of lock-up options); Note, Lock-up Options, supra note
6, at 1080-81 (suggesting general procedural and substantive questions that courts should address
in considering validity of lock-up options).
164. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275-77; supra notes 87-120 (discussing Second Circuit's
decision in Hanson Trust); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-85; supra notes 41-85 (discussing Delaware
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contemporary judicial trend towards narrowing the scope of the business
judgment rule, boards should opt to err on the side of caution.' 65 Directors
contemplating the use of a lock-up option, therefore, should seek to attain
four major categories of conduct currently sanctioned by the courts. First,
directors should avoid implementing lock-up measures during the heat-of-
the-battle and, instead, should plan defensive measures well in advance of
an actual hostile takeover bid.'6 Second, the board must show that it is
generally disinterested in whatever bid ultimately is successful. 67 Third, the
target board adequately must inform themselves of all the advantages and
disadvantages of the contemplated lock-up option, as well as all reasonable
alternatives. 6 8 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the board must act in
the best interest of the company and its shareholders. 69
By planning in advance of a hostile takeover bid, a board may leisurely
solicit prime tender offers from otherwise reluctant suitors, grant lock-up
options and present bids to shareholders for their approval. 70 Although
shareholder approval is recognized as a carte blanche to management discre-
tion, most lock-up options only serve to deter existing hostile tender offers
and, hence, an advance lock-up typically is impractical.' 7' A board of
directors, however, still may utilize an advance lock-up and gain shareholder
approval by implementing an employee stock option plan (ESOP).172 An
ESOP, set up in advance of a takeover, has the advantage of benefitting at
least some shareholders by ensuring corporate control in those individuals
Supreme Court and Delaware Court of Chancery decisions in Revlon); Enstar, slip op. at 12-
13; supra notes 127-42 (discussing Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Enstar); supra
note 122 (discussing relevant recent New York law and Delaware law interpreting lock-up
options).
165. See Lipton and Brownstein, supra note 1, at 1404-07 (discussing close judicial scrutiny
of lock-up options); supra note 122 (citing courts and commentators advocating careful judicial
scrutiny of lock-up options).
166. See Pitt, supra note 20, at 399-403 (advocating advance planning as important aspect
of successful antitakeover scheme); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1082-83
(Del. Ch.) (suggesting that director flexibility and advance planning are essential to validity of
poison pill antitakeover device), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
167. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249-50 (court of chancery suggesting that interested board
cannot satisfy duty of loyalty).
168. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275-77 (inadequately informed board violated duty of
due care).
169. See Enstar, slip op. at 12 (corporate board's primary fiduciary duty is ensuring fairness
to shareholders).
170. See Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 70,-, 194 A. 23, 23
(1937) (shareholders have collective power to authorize corporate activities).
171. See Enstar, slip op. at 11. In Enstar, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that
without some pressing need for granting a lock-up option, such as the need to spur a competitive
offer from a white knight in the face of a hostile tender offer, few shareholders would approve
of a device that would stifle competitive bidding. Cf. id. But see infra notes 172-79 and
accompanying text (discussing employee stock option plans).
172. See Pitt, supra note 20, at 438-51 (discussing use of ESOP as effective antitakeover
device).
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most likely to revel in the company's success, the employees.1
7' Thus, a
significant ESOP lock-up effectively may prevent a hostile bust-up take-
over.' 74 A major hurdle to implementing an ESOP, however, is the Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).'" ERISA provides
statutory guidelines for the actions of ESOP trustees that are more stringent
than the level of fiduciary duty that the business judgment rule requires of
directors. 76 For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Donovan v. Bierwirth struck down an ESOP
defensive scheme solely because the ESOP trustees had failed to comply with
their fiduciary duties under ERISA.
1 7 In Donovan, the district court found
that the ESOP's three trustees, who were also directors in the target company,
had acted in their own self-interest by fending off a hostile tender offer and,
consequently, invalidated the ESOP under ERISA.'
7 A careful reading of
the district court's opinion, however, suggests that a board may employ a
fairly conceived ESOP using a proper, independent trustee, as a permissible
advance takeover defense.1
79
173. See Hussey, Mergers and Acquisitions-Selected Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of
Interest Issues, in PLI, SEVENTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 463, 463 (S. Friedman, C.
Nathan & H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
498). An ESOP is attractive to corporate directors and is an effective device in fending off
hostile takeover bids for several reasons. See id. First, employees generally follow incumbent
management on voting issues and, therefore, will repel hostile tender offers. Id. Second,
directors favor ESOPs because the plan's trustee may use the ESOP funds to counter a raider's
bid for the stock of the target company. Id. Third, the target board can finely tune the ESOP
as an alternative acquisition option to deter or prohibitively increase the cost of a competing
hostile bid. Id. And finally, an ESOP may facilitate a target management's leveraged buyout
due to the attractive interest rate banks set on funds borrowed against an ESOP. Id.
174. See id. at 438-39 (optioning stock to employees creates dilution problem for raiders);
supra note 6 (discussing dilution problem).
175. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (provisions
of ERISA prescribing fiduciary responsibilities of statute).
176. See id. ERISA defines two major fiduciary duties to which trustees must adhere for
the benefit of beneficiaries. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). First, section 1104(a)(l)
of Title 29 of the United States Code provides that trustees must act solely in the interest of 
a
plan's beneficiaries. Id. at 468; see 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982) (prudent man standard 
of
care). Second, § 1106(b)(2) provides that trustees may not act on the behalf of any parties
adverse to a plan's beneficiaries. Donovan, 538 F. Supp. at 468; see 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2)
(1982) (prohibiting transactions adverse to beneficiaries). Courts interpret the fiduciary obliga-
tions that Congress placed on ERISA trustees according to common law principles of ordinary
fiduciaries under the common law of trusts. Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust
Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra note 21 (discussing high standards of
ordinary fiduciaries enunciated in Johnson v. Trueblood; Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). Consequently, under ERISA, ESOP
trustees have a heightened duty of loyalty to their plan beneficiaries. See Donovan, 538 
F.
Supp. at 468 (ESOP trustees have duty to act selflessly for benefit of beneficiaries under
ERISA).
177. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 475 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), modified, 680 F.2d
263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
178. Donovan, 538 F. Supp. at 475.
179. See id. (court struck down ESOP solely because plan trustees had conflicting fiduciary
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When advance planning is insufficient to deter a hostile takeover bid, a
board of directors faced with an unsolicited tender offer must not act with
self-serving motives in dealing with the offer. s0 A board of directors'
obligation to act disinterestedly and in the shareholders' best interest usually
is satisfied when the target board is independent of the corporation's
management staff.' 8' When a board or its members,however, have conflict
of interest either through significant stock ownership in the target or white
knight companies, or through financial gain in a certain transaction, a court
generally will view a lock-up option disfavorably.'8 2 Although in some
circumstances interested board members simply may abstain from voting on
the decision whether to grant a lock-up option, quorum considerations as
well as independent director inexperience and incompetence may preclude
this solution. 83 Consequently, to avoid the appearance that a board's motive
in granting a lock-up option was to entrench itself or to succumb to
managerial influence, directors should appoint a disinterested "shark screen
committee.""84 The shark screen committee, composed of independent direc-
tors and formed under state corporations law as an executive or special
committee, could assist a predominantly interested target board to implement
a valid lock-up option or other defensive scheme.185 The committee could
interests); see generally Lipton and Brownstein, supra note 1, at 1405 n.17 (suggesting that
directors validly may implement ESOP's by consulting legal advisors and documenting board's
actions). An ESOP implemented in the heat of a hostile tender offer, however, may survive no
better than the lock-up options in Hanson Trust and Revlon because of the probability that
trustees will act with some self-interest. Cf. FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at 97-98 (ESOP trustees
have special obligation to act in shareholder's best interests).
180. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 1986 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,863, at 94,212 (6th
Cir. 1986) (corporate boards must not act with self-serving motives).
181. Cf. id. at 94,213 (disinterested directors' decision implies valid exercise of discretion
unless decision merely is "rubber stamp" of management proposal); Enstar, slip op. at 7 (noting
that 10 disinterested directors composed target board that implemented valid lock-up option).
182. See Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,584, at 94,485-86 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1978) (sale of corporate stock by com-
pany's President invalidated as attempt to perpetuate self-control); Podesta v. Calumet Indus.,
Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,433, at 93,577 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1978)
(voting rights conferred by company board-designed ESOP enjoined as attempt to entrench in-
cumbent directors).
183. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1983) (majority of total number of directors
present at meeting constitutes quorum absent special contrary provision); N.Y. Bus. Cou. LAW
§ 707 (McKinney 1986) (same). Although several state statutes authorize interested directors to
count themselves for quorum considerations, in the absence of such a statute, jurisdictions vary
concerning whether to count interested directors when a quorum is needed for board action.
See HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 209 (student ed. 1983) (discussing problems
of counting interested directors for quorum purposes).
184. Cf. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (upholding validity
of litigation committee in shareholder derivative suit). The shark screen committee could perform
a function in hostile tender offers analogous to the function litigation committees perform in
shareholder derivative suits. Cf. id. (discussing function of litigation committee in shareholder
derivative suits).
185. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 55 (West 1970) (board of directors may
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monitor tender offers and submit to the entire board for approval only those
bids genuinely in the shareholders' interest. Similarly, the committee inde-
pendently could review board decisions in granting a lock-up or other
defensive device and, thus, could retain the power to veto unfair agreements
when permitted by state statutes and corporate by-laws.8 6 The key advantage
to a shark screen committee, therefore, is that a disinterested collegial body
will negate an interested board's bias in assessing the merits of competing
tender offers.1Is The use of a shark screen committee also would alleviate
the problems of interlocking directorates and parent-subsidiary dealings.""'
After ensuring that a disinterested board will decide the lock-up issue, a
board of directors must fully inform itself of whether the lock-up option
serves the shareholders' interests. 89 Accordingly, a board should marshall
all relevant evidence pertaining to the takeover offerors, the nature of the
bids and the potential effect of each bid on the company's shareholders. 190
In evaluating the effect of each bid, the board must inquire thoroughly into
the benefits and consequences to the shareholders of all reasonable alterna-
tives.' 9' As a result, many important rules abound which directors should
follow in determining the propriety of granting a lock-up option, including:
appoint special committee having all powers of board except in certain delineated transactions);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1527-28 (West 1973) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West.
Supp. 1986) (same); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1986) (same); see also MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 42 (1979) (same); see generally Note, Executive Committees-Creation, Procedures
and Authority, WASH. U. L. Q. 42, 53-64 (1967) (defining and delineating broad range of
executive committees and committee powers under various state corporation laws).
186. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 183, at § 212 (board of directors may delegate
power to executive committees if provided by statute). Courts could uphold the shark screen
committee's power to retain a veto over unfair agreements as a means to facilitate corporate
policy favoring shareholders in the same way that courts validate the power retained by a
litigation committee to veto vexing shareholder derivative suits. Cf. Zapata v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (upholding power of litigation committee to veto shareholder derivative
suits deemed injurious to corporate policy).
187. Cf. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 (July 18, 1978) (arguing that independent
directors should dominate composition of corporate boards to ensure shareholder democracy);
Earle, Corporate Governance and the Outside Director-A Modest Proposal, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 787, 794-95 (1979) (corporations have increased number of representative, outside
directors on company boards in response to social and political changes in corporate governance).
188. Cf. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 183, at § 204 (citing Congress' statutory goal to
inhibit interlocking directorates); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVT. AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2ND
Sss., REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS (Comm.
Print 1978) (urging extensive prohibition of interlocking directorates in corporate governance
schemes).
189. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 276-77; supra notes 87-120 (discussing Second Circuit's
decision in Hanson Trust); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1984) (corporate
board may not invoke business judgment rule to shield directors from liability for uninformed
decisions); supra note 22 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom).
190. See Guidelines for Directors, supra note 2, at 220 (directors faced with hostile tender
offer must gather and collate all relevant data affecting decision).
191. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 1986 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,863, at 94,212-13
(6th Cir. 1986) (availability of reasonable alternatives is factor to consider in reviewing directors'
decision); Enstar, slip op. at 7-9 (same).
1158 [Vol. 43:1125
LOCK-UP OPTION
exhaustively soliciting as many competing suitors as possible;' 92 ensuring a
wealth of independent, outside and fully informed legal and financial advi-
sors; 193 raising copious questions to ensure informed decisions and employ
fully the advisors' expertise;' 94 utilizing adequate time to digest and under-
stand all pertinent data and documents; 95 taking extensive corporate minutes
to create a further evidentiary source in support of the board's decision;'
9
and finally, resisting no-shop clauses that inhibit the competitive bidding
process. 97 While the proffered criteria is not exhaustive, the list should
192. See Enstar, slip op. at 7, 12; supra notes 135-36, 141 and accompanying text (Enstar
court's favorable finding that Enstar board thoroughly canvassed scores of potential suitors for
control of corporation).
193. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275-76; supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text
(Hanson Trust court's unfavorable finding that SCM board inadequately informed themselves
prior to relying on conclusory financial and legal advice). But see supra note 25 (courts finding
that directors permissibly relied on expert financial advisors).
194. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (target
board must adequately inform itself prior to making decision affecting shareholder rights);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1984) (same); supra note 21 (courts that require
board of directors to act only on fully informed basis); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (same). A target board may make several key inquiries to establish that its
reliance on advisors was a product of an informed and fair judgment. Cf. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 872. A board of directors may seek to obtain information concerning the number offers
tendered; the reputation of the offeror; the financial aspects of the offer; the projected impact
to the company, the shareholders and the employees; the current value of the locked-up assets;
the possible methods used to determine a fair range valuation; the correlation between the
tendered price and the valuation range; factors worthy of consideration beyond price; the
liquidation price of the company; the value of the company as a going concern; the possibility
of gaining competing or better offers without the lock-up; the advantages and consequences of
any alternatives; the existence of legal or regulatory matters to disrupt adoption of the lock-up
device; the projected impact to the company if the deal is unsuccessful; and, of course, the
extent to which the lock-up is in the best interests of shareholders. Cf. Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 1986 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,863, at 94,212-13 (6th Cir. 1986) (need for pursuing
alternate courses of action to show actions aimed at maximizing shareholder benefit); Hanson
Trust, 781 F.2d at 275-76 (need for qualified advisors and informed decision); Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 182 (need for actions in shareholders' best interest); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (need
for adequately informed decision).
195. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (hasty board decision found grossly negligent);
supra note 22 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom). Perhaps target
boards faced with takeover proposals should standardize a practice of overnight deliberations
or multiple meetings to fully investigate and digest all relevant information. Cf. Hanson Trust,
781 F.2d at 275 (target board's three-hour midnight meeting culminating in decision to grant
lock-up option found violative of duty of due care); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (two-hour
meeting culminating in decision to grant lock-up option found violative of duty of due care).
196. Cf. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 289-90 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (arguing that target
board based implementation of lock-up option on informed decision in part because directors
detailed procedure of decision using copiously scribed meeting minutes).
197. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (no-shop agreements may foreclose opportunity for
shareholders to obtain more lucrative bid); Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co. Ltd., 517 F. Supp.
1299, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (target board may not impede opportunity for shareholders to
obtain more lucrative bids). But see Jewel Co. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741
F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding target board's use of no-shop clause under California
contracts law).
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provide a target board contemplating the use of a lock-up option with the
necessary ammunition to legally repel a hostile takeover. 98
Although recent cases suggest that courts are restricting the application
of the business judgment rule to deny protection of antitakeover lock-up
options,199 the lock-up option itself is not dead. Rather, the judicial trend
implies that courts will scrutinize the methods boards use to implement the
device as a means to ensure that corporate boards fulfill the fiduciary
obligation to act in their shareholders' best interests. 200 Consequently, boards
interested in implementing a lock-up option carefully must adhere to the
fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty.20' Provided a corporate board of
directors can establish that the board acted reasonably, independently and
on an informed basis, courts should permit a lock-up option that stimulates
a more lucrative offer for the shareholders of the target company.
JAMEs A. WACHTA
198. Cf. FLEISCHER, supra note 4, at § IV (discussing effective target defense strategies);
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 4, at § 6 (same); Lipton and Brownstein, supra note 1, at
1403-10 (same); Guidelines for Directors, supra note 2, at 209-21 (same); Pitt, supra note 20 at
402-04 (suggesting formation of target hostile takeover preparation committee); cf. also Warden,
The Boardroom as a War Room: The Real World Applications of the Duty of Care and the
Duty of Loyalty, 40 Bus. LAW. 1431, 1431-36 (1985) (case study involving director fiduciary
duties).
199. See supra note 122 (cases and commentators suggesting that judicial trend is toward
narrowing business judgment rule with respect to directors' decision to implement lock-up
options).
200. See Enstar slip op. at 11; supra note 131-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Enstar); supra note 122 (cases and commentators
suggesting that judicial trend is toward narrowing business judgment rule with respect to
directors' decision to implement lock-up options).
201. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text (discussing board of directors duty of
due care and duty of loyalty and their relationship to business judgment rule).
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